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Authorized by §2-15-10 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws, the 
Legislative Audit Council, created in 1975, reviews the operations of state 
agencies, investigates fiscal matters as required, and provides information to 
assist the General Assembly. Some audits are conducted at the request of 
groups of legislators who have questions about potential problems in state 
agencies or programs; other audits are performed as a result of statutory 
mandate. 
The Legislative Audit Council is composed of five public members, one of 
whom must be a practicing certified or licensed public accountant and one 
of whom must be an attorney. In addition, four members of the General 
Assembly serve ex officio. 
Audits by the Legislative Audit Council conform to generally accepted 
government auditing standards as set forth by the Comptroller General of the 
United States. 
Copies of all LAC audits are available to the public at no charge. 
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Executive Summary 
JEDA significantly 
overstated job 
creation/retention figures in 
its annual report to the 
General Assembly and the 
Governor. 
Members of the General Assembly requested that we conduct a management 
and performance audit encompassing all of the South Carolina Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority (JEDA), its programs, activities, and affiliated 
corporations. JEDA was established in 1983 and as of October 31, 1994, 
had made 220 direct loans and guarantees totalling $56.6 million and had 
issued 88 bonds totaling $447 million. Most loans were made with federal 
community development block grant (CDBG) funds and with state funds 
appropriated to capitalize a revolving loan fund for JEDA's 
corporation-Carolina Capital Investment Corporation (CCIC). 
The number of jobs created and retained by JEDA's client businesses is an 
important measure of the success of its programs, as is the percent of private 
funds invested along with JEDA's loans Oeveraged). 
• JEDA significantly overstated job creation/retention figures in its annual 
report to the General Assembly and the Governor. JEDA counts jobs 
from loans to businesses which have gone into default and/or bankruptcy 
and for which the jobs no longer exist. JEDA also counts the same jobs 
as created and as retained when it issues more than one loan to a 
company. It claims credit for retaining jobs when it is questionable 
whether the jobs would have been lost without government assistance, 
and claims all jobs when projects are funded jointly with another 
government agency. JEDA has no written procedures on how jobs 
should be counted (see p. 7). 
JEDA provides "gap financing." It was created to fill gaps in the capital 
market and to fill the void between what a business needs and what a bank 
is willing to lend. However, as a manager of public funds, JEDA also must 
properly safeguard its loans from loss. We reviewed JEDA's loan portfolio 
to see how loans were made and what amount of loan funds were lost when 
debts were forgiven or "charged off." 
• JEDA allows a committee of the Board of Directors, as well as loan 
officers, to approve loans. This violates JEDA's statutes and by""laws 
(seep. 12). 
• JEDA has charged off24 CDBG loans as ofJuly 31, 1994; 18 had 90% 
or more of the original loan amount forgiven. While charge-<>ffs have 
declined since 1991, we found JEDA increasingly is allowing borrowers 
to defer loan payments. This may understate future rates of delinquent 
and defaulted loans. With a charge-off rate of 12.72%, JEDA is higher 
than other in-state economic development loan programs, whose rates 
ranged from less than 2% to 7.26% (seep. 12). 
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Our review found that the 
majority of JEDA's programs 
has not met key economic 
development goals set forth 
in the law. 
Executive Summary 
JEDA has not collected and analyzed economic development information and 
has not established a strategic plan with goals and performance measures for 
its programs. Without these mechanisms, JEDA cannot determine whether 
its programs are necessary and have been effective in promoting economic 
development in the state. Measures such as job quality, targeting specific 
industries, helping historically distressed counties and small businesses, and 
quality of service are important to JEDA's program outcomes. For example: 
• Only 43% of the CDBG loan funds and 7% of the bond financing has 
actually gone to businesses located in historically distressed counties of 
the state (see p. 22). 
• JEDA says it loans to small businesses but has not developed a definition 
of small business as required by law (see p. 22). 
Our review found that the majority of JEDA's programs have not met key 
economic development goals. We excluded five programs from review 
because they had little or no activity. Three programs we reviewed have had 
limited success. For example: 
• The Industrial Development Bond (IDB) Program-67% of the jobs 
attributed to this program since 1985 were retained; only 33% of all the 
jobs were created after the companies received bond financing. Eighteen 
percent of the companies with bonds failed to create jobs, and the 
average cost per new job was high-$102,425 (see pp. 10, 24). 
• The Export Program-Since 1989, JEDA has made only 5 loan 
guarantees (2 to the same company) and created approximately 17 jobs 
with. its export financing (see p. 28). 
• The Palmetto Basic Building Fund-Since 1989, only 15 jobs have been 
created and only 2 buildings sold (see p. 30). 
In our examination of compliance with loan policies and procedures, we 
found instances where JEDA made loans to borrowers with substantial net 
worth and did not require adequate collateral or personal guarantees. 
• Four cases with inadequate collateral accounted for 22% of the losses 
incurred in CDBG loan program (see p. 35). 
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Major 
Recommendation 
Executive Summary 
• CCIC does not have a policy limiting the percent of a total project's cost 
it can fund with its loans. It has leveraged less private investment than 
JEDA, with only $1.67 in private funds for every public dollar 
(seep. 40). 
• JEDA needs to require that all loan proceeds are appropriately expended 
and needs to strengthen its conflict of interest policy (seep. 41). 
During the course of the audit, we found several problems with financial 
transactions between JEDA and CCIC. JEDA placed $583,000 in state 
appropriations in CCIC's revolving loan fund to make loans to businesses. 
This may be in violation of state law. JEDA should return its FY 94-95 
appropriation of $125,000 and use CCIC's fund balance to provide federal 
matching requirements in place of state appropriations (seep. 45). 
We also found that CCIC overcharged JEDA for administrative expenses, 
which are paid by state and federal appropriations. CCIC recovered from 
JEDA about $205,000 more than its actual costs for personnel. We also 
found that JEDA owes CCIC $161,000 in fees for managing another 
program. JEDA also used an effective administrative cost rate of 29% in 
charging the Division of Economic Development (OED) for administration 
of the five loans made in the Minority Loan Program. JEDA also may have 
overcharged for its administration of the Palmetto Basic Building Fund 
Program (see p. 46). 
We also identified issues for further study including the need to reexamine 
the state's position relative to capital gaps (seep. 61). Finally, we conclude 
that there may be no need for JEDA to remain an independent state agency. 
JEDA currently consists of two employees and a governing board. All its 
staff and functions were transferred to its corporate affiliate, CCIC, in 
FY 92-93. JEDA's functions as a state agency are primarily to provide 
oversight and monitoring of the CDBG loan program, to approve CDBG 
loans, and to issue industrial development bonds. 
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Executive Summary 
Possible restructuring of JEDA is a policy issue that could be considered. As 
long as oversight of the CDBG loan program and CCIC is provided, and the 
loan decision process is shielded from political pressure, JEDA can be 
restructured into the state's lead economic development agency-the 
Department of Commerce. We base our conclusion on the subsequent 
findings in this report as well as the following major considerations: 
• As part of the Department of Commerce, JEDA's financing programs 
could be more closely aligned with statewide economic development 
goals. 
• We found a need in general for better oversight of JEDA's programs, 
particularly the relationship between JEDA and its corporate afflliate 
CCI C. 
• The Division of Economic Development (DED) was formerly part of the 
Governor's office but is now in the Department of Commerce. DED 
administers the state's CDBG program. It receives CDBG allocations 
from HUD and previously made economic development loans as well as 
grants for infrastructure. DED staff report directly to the secretary of 
commerce. 
• Federal, local, and private institutions, as well as a new state initiative 
called the "Main Street Investment Program," provide major sources of 
financing for economic development. While the demand for CDBG-
funded loans and tax-exempt industrial bonds continues, there may no 
longer be a need for a separate state authority like JEDA to administer 
them. 
• Other states such as Georgia, Kentucky, and North Carolina have 
structured their economic development loan programs in various ways, 
either at the local level or in agencies such as a Department of 
Commerce or a Department of Local Government . 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
Audit Objectives Members of the General Assembly asked that the Legislative Audit Council 
(LAC) conduct a management and performance audit encompassing all of the 
Jobs-Economic Development Authority (JEDA), its programs and activities 
and its affiliated corporations. The council completed the evaluation of 
JEDA's role in the South Carolina Resources Authority Infrastructure 
Funding Program in October 1994. That report is available free of charge 
from our office. 
The overall objective of this report is to examine other responsibilities of 
JEDA and its affiliated corporations, primarily the Carolina Capital 
Investment Corporation (CCIC), in order to evaluate how these programs 
have fulfilled their role in state economic development. To accomplish this 
evaluation we were guided by several objectives: 
• Examine the relationship of JEDA/CCIC programs with the state target 
programs for economic development. 
• Review JEDA/CCIC lending policies and procedures to determine the 
adequacy of such procedures in safeguarding limited resources. 
• Review loan activity and processing using selected HUD requirements, 
state statutes, and JEDA/CCIC program policies and goals. 
• Examine associated administrative and operations costs. 
We reviewed information from 1983 through 1994 encompassing both 
current and charged-off loans. We did not review in detail loans that were 
of recent origin with short payment histories. Detailed information on the 
methodology used in this review is found in the text and also in Appendix A. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
The Jobs-Economic Development Authority (JEDA) was created by Act 145 
of 1983 (the South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Fund Act). 
JEDA's purpose under this act is to promote the economic welfare of the 
state by aiding small to medium size businesses with their fmancing needs. 
A primary aim of JEDA is to provide for the creation and retention of jobs. 
Another goal of JEDA is to encourage (leverage) the investment of private 
funds. JEDA is to accomplish its mission by providing loans, issuing bonds, 
and assisting in developing an export market for the goods, products, and 
services produced within the state. JEDA currently operates a not-for-profit 
corporation, CCIC. 
JEDA is governed by a board of seven directors appointed by the Governor. 
One director is appointed from each congressional district and one from the 
state at large, who serves as the chairman. Directors must have experience 
in the fields of business, commerce, finance, banking, real estate, or foreign 
trade. At least two directors must have direct lending experience. 
Both JEDA's and CCIC's loan programs are funded principally by two 
revolving loan funds, bond issues, and CCIC's line of credit with four South 
Carolina banks. JEDA provides "gap financing." It was created to fill gaps 
in the capital market and to fill the void between what a business needs to 
borrow and what a bank is willing to lend. JEDA is a financing program, 
not an economic development bank. It does not have resident investment 
funds from outside private sources and is not subject to banking regulations 
or oversight from bank regulators. JEDA's programs are funded by the 
following sources: 
• The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) revolving loan fund, 
capitalized (initially funded) by United States Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) funds, provides loans to eligible participants 
of the CDBG Loan Program. This program funds the lesser of 40% of 
a project's cost or up to $25,000 per job for a maximum amount of 
$500,000. A local government receives the grant and then conveys the 
loan or guarantee to the businesses. 
• The CCIC revolving loan fund, capitalized by state funds and revenues 
from fees for services, provides loans to eligible private for-profit 
enterprises. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
• JEDA administers a tax-exempt industrial development bond (IDB) 
program designed to allow small and medium-sized manufacturing and 
non-profit corporations access to capital markets for financing at rates 
lower than could be acquired through commercial institutions. 
• In order to provide working capital for making loans, CCIC bas a 
revolving line of credit not to exceed $2,000,000 with four South 
Carolina banks. The corporation can obtain advances and repay them on 
a revolving basis with interest charged at the prime interest rate. This 
line of credit also funds an Export Working Capital Guarantee Program 
that guarantees loans to South Carolina businesses involved in exporting. 
In FY 89-90, JEDA began administering the Division of Economic 
Development's (Governor's office) Joan portfolio and is responsible for the 
accounting and collection of these loans. 
In the administration of its various lending programs, JEDA is authorized to 
set interest rates on bonds without Budget and Control Board approval, 
renegotiate a loan in default, waive a default, forgive all or part of a loan, 
bring foreclosure actions, and dispose of collateral. In the event of failure 
or default relating to JEDA's or CCIC's financial transactions, neither the 
state nor JEDA bas any financial liability above and beyond any commitment 
or pledge from a specific revenue or source, as stated within the terms of the 
individual bond issue, loan, or other transaction. 
On July 1, 1992, JEDA transferred its 22 employees, net assets of $17,884, 
and furniture and equipment valued at $50,632 to CCIC. JEDA entered into 
a servicing agreement whereby CCIC would conduct, manage, and operate 
JEDA's day-to-day business operations. These activities include marketing, 
underwriting, and credit analysis. To comply with HUD requirements, the 
executive director and a loan administration officer were subsequently 
transferred back to JEDA. 
Also, in 1992 amendments to JEDA's legislation exempted JEDA and CCIC 
from most state oversight: 
• Employees of JEDA and CCIC are not considered state employees except 
for participation in the state retirement and health insurance systems. 
• JEDA was exempted from the state procurement code (except for 
minority businesses provisions). Any corporation formed by JEDA is 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
considered to be a public procurement unit, which allows JEDA to 
contract with such a corporation as if it were another state agency. 
• JEDA is exempted from §2-7-65 which requires agencies to fJ.le budget 
requests and program evaluation information. 
• Both JEDA and CCIC are exempted from state personnel rules, including 
those of the Agency Head Salary Commission. Approval from the Joint 
Legislative Committee on Personnel is no longer required to exceed the 
number of positions authorized in the general appropriation act. 
In his FY 92-93 budget proposal, the Governor recommended that the 
general fund appropriation for JEDA be phased out within two years, and 
that JEDA become a self-sufficient enterprise agency. However, in 
FY 94-95, JEDA received $125,000 in general funds and is budgeted to 
receive this amount again in FY 95-96. These funds are not appropriated 
directly to JEDA but instead are appropriated to the State Budget and Control 
Board's Division of Local Government which then transfers the funds to 
JEDA. As a result, JEDA appears self-sufficient while continuing to receive 
state appropriations (see Appendix C). 
Under §41-43-240 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, JEDA is authorized 
to establish for-profit or not-for-profit corporations to carry out the purposes 
of the Economic Development Fund Act. Terms and conditions of corporate 
responsibilities are to be defined by JEDA. 
JEDA's current corporate affiliate, Carolina Capital Investment Corporation, 
operates as a not-for-profit corporation with a corresponding purpose to that 
of the previous corporation. It was created "to act as a development finance 
institution to promote the growth of productive private investment . . . . " 
The corporation was created as an eleemosynary entity in order to participate 
in certain lending programs which were not available to its for-profit 
predecessor. Corporate assets must be distributed to JEDA or the state in the 
event of CCIC's dissolution. 
Following are two graphs of the corporations as established by JEDA. The 
first shows corporate affiliates established and the second their capitalization 
with state funds. 
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Graph 1.1: Corporate History 
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Jobs-Economic Corporation (not-for-profit) 
••••••••••••••••••••• (Dissolved) 
JOBEC* Corporation (for-profit) *** (Dissolved) 
-----** Carolina Capital Investment Corporation (not-for-profit) 
This for-profit entity was referred to as the "mirror" corporation of JEDA. The term was used to describe the Board of Directors of the 
corporation which was identical to JEDA's board. 
** Changed name to Carolina Capital Investment Corporation (for-profit). 
* * * Changed name to CCIC, Inc. (for-profit). 
Graph 1.2: Capitalization of Corporate Affiliates With State Funds 
1985 
$1 million $1 million $1 million 
(General Assembly) -+ ( JEDA ) -+ 
$454,513 
(General Assembly J 
~ 4) 
.... ( 
Jobs-Economic 
Corporation 
(not-for-profit) 
1989 
$454,513 
=:) .... 
.... 
CCIC, Inc. 
(for-profit) 
'a. 
., 
1992 
$1,524.6168 
Carolina Capital 
Investment 
Corporation 
(non-profit) 
a According to audited financial statements, June 30, 1994. This includes initial state-funded capitalization as well as retained earnings and net 
assets transferred by JEDA. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Background 
CCIC's Board of Directors consists of seven members. One member is the 
chairman of JEDA's board who also serves as CCIC's chairman. Two other 
members are also members of JEDA's board. The remaining four members 
are appointed by CCIC's board and, according to by-laws, cannot be 
members of the JEDA board but should be qualified persons with experience 
in the fields of business, commerce, finance, banks, or economic 
development. 
According to correspondence received by the LAC from JEDA's chief 
operating officer (CEO), JOBEC Corporation, JEDA's for-profit corporation, 
did not issue any capital stock. However, an amendment to the articles of 
incorporation dated January 26, 1987, indicates that 5,000 shares of stock 
were outstanding. We have been unable to determine the basis for the 
mention of outstanding shares in this document. Since the corporate officers 
signed the amendment showing the issuance of the shares, the attorneys who 
prepared the document confirmed to the LAC they have no reason to doubt 
its validity and correctness. 
The same act that appropriated the funds to JEDA, amended JEDA's statute 
to authorize it to make grants to any not-for-profit corporation. Had the 
General Assembly intended to authorize JEDA to make grants to for-profit 
in addition to not-for-profit corporations, it would have written the law 
accordingly. JEDA accomplished indirectly (by passing the funds through a 
non-profit corporation) what it lacked the power to do directly. 
In addition, it appears that the action taken to transfer the funds from the 
non-profit corporation may have violated its Declaration and Petition for 
Incorporation which states ". . . the Corporation's property shall not be 
conveyed to any organization created or operated for profit . . . . " 
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Chapter 2 
Economic Development Goals 
Job Creation 
JEDA's principal mandate is to provide economic development financing to 
small and medium businesses which need capital in order to retain or create 
jobs. The number of jobs attributed to JEDA's client businesses as a result 
of loan activity is an important measure of the success of its programs. 
While some of JEDA's programs have helped businesses expand and create 
jobs, we found that JEDA overstated the jobs attributed to its loan programs. 
In violation of its statutes and by-laws, JEDA allows a committee of the 
board or an employee to approve loans. We also reviewed JEDA's ability 
to safeguard loan funds from losses. In one case we found CCIC invested 
in a corporation in exchange for stock which may be prohibited by the South 
Carolina Constitution. The entire investment was charged off as a loss. 
We considered other performance measures as well as strategic planning. We 
excluded 5 of JEDA's llloan programs from review because they either had 
no activity or had issued few loans. Additionally, we have included a review 
of three other financing programs that were not efficient or effective in 
creating jobs, and as currently operated may not be designed to meet key 
economic development goals. 
We also reviewed a sample of loans to evaluate JEDA's administration of its 
CDBG and CCIC revolving loan funds, including policies and procedures 
regarding collateralization, eligibility, use of loan proceeds, and conflict of 
interest. Loan policies and procedures are established in order to control 
JEDA's exposure to loss, safeguard use of program funds, and ensure that 
borrowers are eligible to participate in the program. Our findings in this 
area are based on a sample of loans and suggest some problems. 
JEDA has significantly overstated its job creation/retention figures in its 
annual report to the General Assembly and the Governor. In its FY 93-94 
annual report, JEDA stated it had created or retained 24,009 jobs since its 
inception. We question the accuracy of this number and find it unreliable as 
a measure of program success. Also, JEDA takes "credit" for retained jobs 
without first determining that its loans made the critical difference in a 
borrower's ability to keep these jobs. 
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CDBG Program 
Chapter 2 
Economic Development Goals 
Job creation and retention is an important measure of the effectiveness of 
JEDA's economic development programs. Section 41-43-70 of JEDA's 
enabling legislation states that one of its goals is to ". . . provide maximum 
opportunities for creation and retention of jobs .... " Section 41-43-260 
requires JEDA to report annually ". . . a good faith estimate of the number 
of jobs retained or created as a result of the authority's assistance." JEDA 
does monitor businesses that have received assistance to verify employment 
and compliance with CDBG regulations, but has no written policy on how 
jobs are to be counted. In order to evaluate the results of these programs, 
JEDA should report information related to program outcomes fully and 
accurately. By not accurately counting jobs, JEDA has overstated its 
effectiveness in the creation and retention of jobs. 
The 24,009 figure is comprised of two major categories, jobs created or 
retained through the CDBG direct loan program and jobs created or retained 
through the industrial development revenue bond (IDB) program. 
For the CDBG program, JEDA's FY 93-94 annual report includes 11,046 
jobs that have been created or retained since JEDA's inception in 1983. We 
determined that this number included 3,497 jobs attributed to businesses 
which had gone into default and/or bankruptcy (charged-off), resulting in the 
loss of these jobs as well as loan funds. For example, one company for 
which JEDA claimed 1,883 jobs went out of business approximately six 
months after JEDA made the loan; as of 1994 this company had one 
employee. 
Jobs Counted as Both Created and Retained 
We reviewed job monitoring records for a judgmental sample of 24 CDBG 
loans. For these 24loans JEDA counted a total of 2,462 jobs. We found, 
however, that 541 of these jobs had been counted twice, first as created jobs 
and then as retained jobs. For example, JEDA made a loan to a company to 
which it attributed the creation of 326 jobs. A year later, the company was 
experiencing a cash flow crisis and JEDA made a second loan for the purpose 
of retaining the previously created jobs. JEDA's FY 93-94 annual report 
attributes the creation/retention of 652 jobs to the two loans made to this 
company. In a second case, a company received two loans under similar 
circumstances. The first loan created the jobs and the second loan retained 
them. JEDA attributed 430 jobs to the two loans made to this company. 
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The total number of jobs attributed to these companies, therefore, is 1,082. 
We reviewed the monitoring reports available and found that the total 
employment for these loans was 347, a difference of 735 from the number 
of jobs JEDA attributed to these companies. 
Retained Jobs 
JEDA claims credit for retaining jobs when it is questionable whether the 
jobs would have been lost without JEDA's assistance. For example, JEDA 
made a loan to one company for the purpose of retaining 90 jobs and 
creating 30 additional jobs. However, a monitoring report done by HUD 
found that the loan had been made without any indication that the company 
was about to close. Thus, it is questionable whether the 90 retained jobs 
should have been counted. We found five other loans where JEDA included 
retained jobs in its jobs figure where we question the inclusion of these jobs. 
JEDA counted 914 jobs created/retained for these six loans. However, based 
on our review, only 487 jobs should have been counted, a difference of 427 
jobs. 
Projects Funded With Other Government Agencies 
In our sample, we found two instances where projects were funded by more 
than one government agency. However, JEDA claimed all of the jobs as 
resulting from its loans. For example, both JEDA and the Governor's office 
Division of Economic Development (DED) provided CDBG funds for a 
company that anticipated creating 281 jobs. In another instance, a company 
received both CDBG funds from JEDA and federal Economic Development 
Administration (ED A) funds through a local Council of Government (COG). 
Both required creation of jobs as part of the requirement for receiving the 
funds. 
For the IDB program, JEDA's FY 93-94 annual report includes 12,963 jobs 
as being created or retained through the program. This number is overstated 
by 940 jobs. Our numbers differ from JEDA's because JEDA does not 
always incorporate its most recent monitoring reports in bond data. Also, 
JEDA counted the same jobs twice for companies which refinanced an earlier 
bond with a new bond. In reviewing job statistics, we examined JEDA's 
bond applications and job monitoring records for the 88 bonds JEDA issued 
before September 30, 1994. 
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Retained Jobs 
Of the 12,023 jobs we identified, 8,081 (67%) were jobs that were retained; 
only 3,942 (33%) actually were created after the companies received bond 
financing. Since all businesses applying for lOBs must demonstrate financial 
stability it is questionable whether these jobs would have been lost without 
JEDA's assistance. For example, JEDA issued a bond in 1990 for the 
purpose of funding a hospital expansion. At the time the bond was issued, 
the hospital had 1,083 employees. By 1993, the hospital's total employment 
had grown to approximately 1,500. This is the job figure included in 
JEDA's FY 93-94 annual report for this bond. Since the bond was to pay for 
an expansion, it is questionable whether JEDA's actions resulted in the 
retention of the 1,083 jobs that existed at the time the bond was issued. 
Of the 88 bonds issued, 10 (11%) were issued within the past 18 months; 2 
(2%) never actually funded a project; 60 (68%) resulted in new job creation; 
16 (18%) did not create new jobs. 
JEDA has no written procedures on how jobs should be counted. We 
discussed with JEDA officials how they arrived at the 24,009 job figure. 
Initially, we were informed that the figure was based on actual jobs as shown 
in the most recent monitoring report, not the company's "historical high" 
employment level. Also, according to JEDA officials, a job should exist at 
least six months before it is included in JEDA's total jobs figure. 
After our inquiry, JEDA revised its method of accounting for jobs. Under 
the new method, monitoring visits are done and the company's "historical 
high" employment level is used to determine the number of jobs 
created/retained. A revised Job Creation Report for February 23, 1995, 
shows a total of 9,154 jobs created or retained by JEDA's CDBG program 
since its inception. This figure is a reduction of 17% from the 11,046 figure 
used in the annual report, but continues to include jobs from charged-off 
loans and jobs which are funded by more than one government agency. 
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In addition, under this new methodology JEDA is counting jobs at all plant 
sites even though the CDBG loan was made when the company had only one 
plant. For example, after receiving a CDBG loan, one company built several 
plants, including one plant outside the county in which the original CDBG 
grant was made. JEDA counts the jobs at all the plant sites built after 1986. 
JEDA counts 897 jobs (10% of its revised total) as being created/retained by 
this one loan. 
One way to better link job creation/retention with JEDA's programs would 
be a survey of client businesses. This would allow JEDA to determine if the 
decision to retain employees and/or hire new ones would have been made in 
the absence of a JEDA Joan or bond issue. 
1 JEDA should establish written procedures for counting and reporting job 
figures. These should include: 
• What percentage of jobs are created versus retained. 
• What percentage of jobs are attributed to loans that have been 
charged off. 
• What other programs are participating in these loans and are 
counting the same jobs in their reporting. 
2 JEDA should only count jobs as created or retained when its activities 
have a direct effect in creating or retaining the jobs. 
3 JEDA should survey client businesses to help determine the impact of its 
programs on job creation and retention. 
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JEDA is in violation of its statutes and by-laws when approving loans. 
Under the current system, JEDA has a loan committee made up of selected 
members of the board. The loan committee receives information from staff 
and either approves or denies loan applications. According to JEDA 
officials, board ratification is required only in cases where the loan 
committee's decision does not follow agency lending policy. In addition, 
both JEDA's and CCIC's Boards of Directors in 1995 approved a policy 
which gives loan officers the authority to approve loans up to $50,000 
without the approval of the loan committee. 
JEDA's statutes and by-laws do not permit a committee of the Board of 
Directors to officially approve loan applications. Nor do they permit 
approval to be granted by one employee. Section 41-43-60 of JEDA's 
statutes and Article 1, Section 4, of the by-laws both require approval of a 
majority of the board to take action. Therefore, the commitment to lend 
money can be taken only by a majority vote at a duly convened board 
meeting. 
4 The Board of Directors of JEDA should comply with legal requirements 
when approving loans. 
We reviewed JEDA's administration of its loan portfolios, particularly its 
policies and procedures regarding loan payments that are deferred, 
delinquent, in default or charged off as uncollectible. Delinquent loans are 
defined as loans where payments are 30 to 59 days past due; defaulted loans 
are 60 or more days past due. 
JEDA must safeguard the assets of three revolving loan funds: its main 
CDBG direct loan program; the CCIC direct loan program; and a second 
CDBG portfolio that was turned over by the Division of Development (DED) 
of the Governor's office to JEDA for servicing. The CCIC loan portfolio 
showed only two charged-off loans. One of these loans was an equity 
investment and is discussed on page 18. The CDBG and OED loan programs 
are discussed in the following pages. 
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We reviewed the total amount of outstanding loan balances that proved 
uncollectible since the inception of JEDA's CDBG direct loan program in 
1983. JEDA's legal costs from debt collection and representation in 
bankruptcy matters amounted to about $25,700 for loans that were charged 
off from FY 90-91 through FY 92-93. This did not include the additional 
costs of staff resources and court fees. 
By July 31, 1994, out of a total of 168 individual CDBG loans made by 
JEDA, 24 (14.3%) had been charged-off. This accounted for a total of 
$6,238,906 in outstanding loans that were not collected (principal and 
accrued interest only). Of the 24 charged-off loans, 18 charged off 90% or 
more of the original loan amount. The following graph offers more detail. 
$50 $49.0 
$42.9 
r---
$40 $37.7 
I 
$33.2 
r 
$30 $27.8 
$20 
$10 
16.7% I l1s.S% I 114.3%1 114.2%1 112.7% 
$0 [2 . 
12131/90 12131/91 12131/92 12131/93 7131194 
As Graph 2.1 shows, JEDA's losses as a percent of cumulative loans 
disbursed have been decreasing. All but two of these bad loans were made 
prior to FY 88-89; the average time between when the loan closed and when 
it was charged off was almost four years. Since borrowers with uncollectible 
loans are usually in bankruptcy and foreclosure proceedings, the process of 
charging off a loan can be a lengthy one. JEDA usually is behind other 
lenders, and often has been unable to recover sufficient collateral. Pages 
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35-39 of this report review specific cases where charged-off loans were 
inadequately collateralized. 
We also reviewed the amount of loans outstanding that were in deferred, 
delinquent or default status. Some of these loans ultimately may be charged 
off; in other cases the borrower will become financially stronger and resume 
payments. We based our analysis of default rates on one performed in May 
1993 by a consultant which was reviewing JEDA's loan portfolio. 
Table 2.1 shows the average deferred, delinquency, and default rates as a 
percent of loan dollars outstanding (i.e., not the original loan amount but the 
amount of principal still owed.) 
We noted one trend from this information: JEDA increasingly is allowing 
borrowers to defer loan payments. A deferred loan means the borrower 
cannot pay in full according to the original note. By allowing deferred 
payments, JEDA may be avoiding a delinquency or default on these loans. 
However, this may understate future rates of delinquent and defaulted loans. 
Table 2.1: Average Rate of JEDA CDBG Loans Deferred. Delinquent. or In Default 
Source: "State of South Carolina, Jobs/Economic Development Authority Analysis of CDBG Loan Portfolio," performed by Williams, Adley & Co., 
and Chemical Securities, Inc.; also, monthly Loan Portfolio Analysis from June 1993 through May 1994. 
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On April 13, 1994, JEDA sold a portion of the cashflow from the repayment 
of its CDBG loans to a private foundation. Called an "asset securitization 
transaction," this sale was the first of its kind to use CDBG-funded loans. 
Under the terms of the transaction, JEDA transferred 45 selected CDBG loans 
to a trust. This created a pool of assets which collateralized .. securities" in 
the form of senior and subordinate certificates. An investor then purchased 
the senior certificates and JEDA received $7,068,105 from the sale. In 
essence, this enabled JEDA to have $7 million to immediately re-lend rather 
than wait for the loans to be repaid. 
The sale had been encouraged by HUD as a way to infuse new funds into 
CDBG lending programs. JEDA was able to perform the transaction because 
of the size of its portfolio, length and accuracy of its payment histories and 
uniformity of its loan standards. The sale had a temporary effect on the rate 
of loans outstanding that were deferred, delinquent, or in default; for June 
and July 1994, the total of these categories averaged 49.38%. This is 
because any loans with possible problems were not included in the 
securitization transaction and remained with JEDA. However, as JEDA lends 
out the proceeds from the sale the rate of delinquent and defaulted loans 
should fall. 
Given the fact that JEDA provides "gap financing," often takes a secondary 
position behind other lenders, and is supposed to target small and start-up 
businesses, loan defaults and cbarge-offs must be interpreted carefully. At 
the same time, JEDA must properly safeguard CDBG funds from loss. We 
found that JED A's losses are higher than other in-state economic development 
loan programs. 
The city of Columbia has a revolving loan fund for economic development 
which consists of mostly Economic Development Administration (ED A) funds 
and some CDBG funds. A city official reported a loss rate of 3% as of 
January 1995. 
The Business Development Corporation of South Carolina (BDCSC) is a 
private, non-profit lender, and its loans are backed by Small Business 
Administration (SBA) guarantees. BDCSC loans to businesses that have been 
turned down by commercial banks; their charge-off rate is less than 2%. 
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The SBA 's charge-off rate for its General Business Program, which consists 
largely of loan guarantees, was 7.26% in South Carolina for 1993. 
Each of the ten regional Councils of Government (COGs) operates a 
revolving loan fund in order to provide gap financing to businesses which 
cannot obtain 100% fmancing from commercial banks. We surveyed the ten 
COGS by telephone: as of January 1995, seven of the COGS have 
experienced charge-off rates of 0% to 3%; two had charge-offs of 10%; one 
had a 26% charge-off. 
It is difficult to determine what an acceptable rate of uncollectible loans 
should be for a program like JEDA's. A report on the CDBG program 
released by the General Accounting Office in February 1994 noted that: 
. . . there is no established acceptable default rate for CDBG economic 
assistance loans. However, given that such loans are usually made to 
businesses that cannot obtain sufficient private financing, a higher than 
normal default rate might be expected . . . . A zero default rate may 
indicate that local grantees are too conservative in the loans they make. 
In contrast, a default rate that is too high may indicate imprudence. 
JEDA also administers another CDBG loan portfolio. From 1983 to 1993, 
the Division of Economic Development in the Governor's office also made 
economic development loans. JEDA assumed responsibility for these loans 
in 1989. In all but two or three cases, JEDA had not participated in 
decisions to award the DED loans; credit analysis and lending decisions had 
been performed by DED staff. JEDA now collects the payments and, for 
most of the loans, returns them to JEDA's own revolving loan fund. 
The DED CDBG loan portfolio turned over to JEDA consisted of 48 loans as 
of September 1994, eight of which have been paid off. Twelve have been 
charged off, resulting in a loss of $1,980,617, or 12.36% of original loan 
amounts. In nine of the charged-off loans, borrowers failed to make any 
payments. 
The following table shows the DED loan portfolio for the past three fiscal 
years. We found that the percentage of DED loans in deferred, delinquent 
or default status was higher than the JEDA loans. According to DED 
officials, OED loans have more problems because DED's lending policy was 
less strict and less specific than JEDA's. 
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Average Balance Due $6,618,818 I $7,486,505 I $8,852,983 
Deferred 29.78% I 39.55% I 47.60% 
Delinquent 20.29% I 2.65% I 0.81% 
Defaulted 8.78% I 24.07% I 12.79% 
Sources: OED Loan Portfolio Analysis, JEDA. 
The sometimes substantial numbers of delinquent and defaulted loans indicate 
that these borrowers are having fmancial problems. JEDA tracks problem 
loans through a weekly "delinquency" report that flags loans with late 
payments and shows what actions staff have taken. However, we identified 
other steps JEDA could take in responding to default situations. 
• According to economic development experts, small and new businesses 
need technical assistance at least as much as they need low-interest loans 
to survive. Many businesses fail because of management problems rather 
than from a lack of capital. Also, §41-43-90 gives JEDA express 
authority to provide management counseling and technical advice. 
However, JEDA's and CCIC's procedures do not incorporate this as a 
part of monitoring businesses with problem loans. If JEDA or CCIC 
cannot directly advise businesses with financial problems, it could refer 
businesses to other sources of technical assistance such as Small Business 
Development Centers. 
• JEDA's lending policies do not spell out what steps loan administration 
can or should take in responding to problem loans. JEDA can help a 
company restructure its loan payments, for example, but officials have 
stated they cannot go beyond this. A written policy clearly stating when 
and under what circumstances JEDA should intervene, what actions it 
should take and what legal authority it has in these situations, would help 
JEDA become more proactive in responding to problem loans. 
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• We found that for at least 7 (29%) of the 24 charged~ff loans, principal 
payments were deferred from the beginning of the payment history. This 
could have been an indication that these would be high-risk loans. While 
JEDA monitors all loans, it does not have a system to classify high-risk 
loans. Loans classified as high-risk could then be scheduled for more 
frequent monitoring visits and financial review. (After JEDA reviewed 
our draft report, they indicated that a loan rating system would be 
developed and presented to the board.) 
5 JEDA should consider the following actions to help businesses with loan 
payment problems. 
• Develop a system to refer businesses to sources of technical 
assistance. 
• Develop a system to classify loans based on level of risk, and 
establish more detailed procedures on responding to problem loans. 
We found that CCIC invested $100,000 in a corporation in exchange for 
common stock. It appears that this type of transaction would be prohibited 
by Article X, §11 of the South Carolina Constitution, which states, "Neither 
the State nor any of its political subdivisions shall become a joint owner of 
or stockholder in any company, association, or corporation . . . . " 
In July 1988, CCIC signed an investment agreement in which CCIC received 
2,915 shares of common stock in exchange for a $100,000 investment in the 
corporation. CCIC's investment represented a 22.5% interest in the 
company. 
By June 1989, less than one year after CCIC's investment, the corporation 
filed for bankruptcy protection. CCIC did not receive an unqualified opinion 
on its financial statements for the period ending June 30, 1989, due to the 
CPA's inability to satisfactorily determine the value of CCIC's investment. 
Since the transaction was structured as an investment, CCIC had not 
required collateral or a personal guarantee from the principal. 
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In March 1990, CCIC's Board of Directors voted to charge off the entire 
amount of $100,000 after legal counsel reviewed documents filed with the 
Bankruptcy Court and concluded that the investment was worthless. 
Since CCIC is limited to functioning, in effect, in lieu of JEDA, it is 
questionable whether CCIC could lawfully own stock in a private company 
when JEDA as a state agency is prohibited from doing so. 
6 In the event JEDA or an affiliated corporation considers becoming a joint 
owner or stockholder of a company in the future, JEDA should first seek 
an attorney general's opinion to clarify whether such a transaction would 
be prohibited by Article X, § 11 of the State Constitution. 
JEDA has no strategic plan of its own which would help it meet legislative 
and program mandates, assess client needs, develop new programs, and fit 
in with statewide economic development policy. In FY 88-89, JEDA, as a 
member of the South Carolina Coordinating Council for Economic 
Development (CCED), participated in a statewide strategic plan which 
resulted in several broad economic development initiatives. According to the 
director for the coordinating council, the objectives of the plan have been 
accomplished where possible. There is currently no new statewide economic 
development plan. 
JEDA's legislation directs it toward several global objectives, including: 
• • • to provide maximum opportunities for creation and retention of jobs 
and improvement of the standard of living of the citizens of the State, 
and ... in the promotion and advancement of industrial, commercial, 
agricultural, and recreational development in this State. 
Furthermore, JEDA's statutes [41-43-70] direct it to " ... encourage and 
assist through loans, investments, research, technical and managerial advice, 
studies, data compilation and dissemination and similar means in the location 
of new business enterprises in this State and in the rehabilitation and 
assistance of existing business . . . . " 
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However, we found that: 
• JEDA has not defined its role in statewide economic development efforts. 
• JEDA has not developed goals and measures which would show the 
impact of JEDA's programs. 
• JEDA has not performed studies, research or data compilation that would 
assist businesses needing economic development information. 
For example, the South Carolina secretary of state's office in 1993 produced 
a handbook on economic development incentives in South Carolina. This 
300-page handbook lists multiple tax, financial, technical and other incentives 
available for business development. JEDA needs a strategic plan to describe 
how its programs coordinate with other economic development incentives 
offered by federal, state, and local governments and non-profit organizations. 
In some areas, such as issuing tax-exempt industrial development bonds, 
JEDA duplicates other government agencies (seep. 26). JEDA's export 
guarantee program is eclipsed by similar programs which offer more 
extensive services (see p. 29). There is little identifiable need for yet another 
JEDA loan program, the Palmetto Building Fund (see p. 30). In fact, there 
are five other lending programs we did not review in-depth because either 
they had no activity or had issued few loans. A strategic plan would help 
JEDA direct its resources to where they are truly needed instead of into 
programs for which there may be little market demand. JEDA could use 
CCIC's capability to develop a strategic plan. 
Possible performance measures are discussed below and are not necessarily 
all-inclusive. Given its broad mandate and its limited resources, JEDA needs 
a strategic plan with specific goals and benchmarks. Otherwise, JEDA 
cannot say with any authority that its programs have been effective in 
creating jobs and promoting economic development in this state. 
JEDA has not established specific goals that deal with the effectiveness and 
quality of its programs. Furthermore, JEDA has not always collected the 
data which would enable it to evaluate its programs, even though most of 
these data are available. 
JEDA from FY 90-91 through FY 92-93 set program goals that dealt with 
"outputs"; these consisted only of setting targets for number of loans, dollar 
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volume of loans, and number of jobs created/retained. JEOA should go 
beyond merely counting the number of loans made or jobs created in 
determining the effect of its programs on client businesses and the economic 
welfare of South Carolina citizens. In addition, loan growth can be a 
perverse incentive, encouraging loans even when it would be better not to 
make the loan. This is especially true since CCIC's income depends on loan 
volume. 
We reviewed economic development studies prepared by the Urban Institute, 
federal CDBG program criteria, the statewide economic development plan of 
1988, and the original legislative findings contained in Act 145 that 
established JEDA in 1983. From these sources we developed a list of 
possible economic development goals and performance indicators. Two 
important measures of performance are discussed elsewhere-jobs created 
and retained on page 7 and the amount of private investment leveraged on 
page 40. 
Indicators of Job Quality 
Indicators of job quality include above-average wage rates, job duration (all 
year versus seasonal), potential for advancement, and potential for worker 
training. Targeting job quality as a goal would address the legislative 
findings of Act 145 of 1983 that, "Low wage rates and high levels of 
unemployment have contributed to the continuation of poverty and its 
attendant ills . . . . " 
JEDA requires borrowers to provide information on wages and job 
descriptions for projected jobs. However, we found no evidence that JEDA 
coJlects and analyzes these data to determine the quality of jobs JEDA loans 
are helping to create. 
Targeting Specific Firms 
The CCED statewide strategic plan called for increasing employment in high 
growth, high value-added service industries, and for diversifying the state's 
industrial base away from reliance on textile manufacturing. We reviewed 
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes of firms receiving JEDA 
loans to see if these kinds of businesses were targeted by JEDA. SIC codes 
identify firms by type (manufacturing, service, retail, etc.) and product line 
(paper, food, textiles, etc.). We determined that since 1983, JEDA bad made 
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40 CDBG loans for a total of $13,319,958 (25% of its portfolio) to textile 
and apparel manufacturing firms. Since the early 1980s, this segment of the 
state's economy has lost employment. 
JEDA states in its annual report that it targets "projects which offer the most 
economic growth and diversity to the state . . . "; however, we found no 
evidence that such "targeting" does occur. Also, while JEDA has SIC codes 
for the businesses which receive CDBG loans, it does not analyze this data 
to determine what kinds of businesses receive assistance. 
Targeting Historically Economically Distressed Counties 
The statewide economic development plan also addressed the need to bring 
economic development to the rural and poor areas of South Carolina. 
JEDA's legislation directs it to develop a definition of historically distressed 
counties; JEDA is allowed to make working capital loans in such areas. 
JEDA also states in its annual reports that its programs are ". . . targeted to 
areas of the state that have the greatest need for public and private 
investment . . . . " 
As of September/October 1994, we found that only 43% of CDBG loan funds 
and 7% of bond financing has actually gone to businesses locating in 
historically distressed counties. JEDA has the necessary data to analyze the 
geographic distribution of its lending activity, but has not done so. 
Targeting Small and Medium Businesses 
JEDA's legislative mandate (§41-43-70) directs JEDA's programs to 
". . . give consideration to the development of and assistance to small 
businesses in this State as may be defined by regulation of the authority." 
In addition, JEDA is to report on the size of businesses receiving assistance 
(§ 41-43-260). And according to economic development literature, many 
new jobs in the U.S. are created by small and start-up firms. 
However, as discussed on page 25, JEDA no longer focuses on small 
businesses through its composite bond program. Also JEDA has not 
collected data to show that it is in fact helping small businesses obtain capital 
and expand; it has not formally defined "small business," but rather uses a 
rule-of-thumb definition of "under $1 million net worth." 
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This definition is inadequate; for instance, it does not account for the wealth 
of parent corporations. In our sample of CDBG loan files, one new company 
receiving two CDBG loans was actually a wholly-owned subsidiary of a 
larger corporation with a net worth of more than $10 million. 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) defines a small business as one 
which is independently-owned and is not dominant in its field. Businesses 
must also meet a size standard based on the total number of employees per 
firm and which varies by type of industry. This better targets businesses that 
really need government loans. 
After JEDA's staff reviewed our draft report, they developed a definition of 
"small business." We have not evaluated the adequacy of this definition (see 
Appendix D). 
Quality of Service 
Periodic surveys of businesses and local economic development officials 
could measure the performance of JEDA and CCIC staff in processing loan 
applications and in responding to clients' concerns and questions. These 
client surveys could also assess businesses' need for technical and managerial 
advice. 
7 JEDA should develop a strategic plan with specific goals and 
performance measures. In doing so, it should ensure it coordinates with 
statewide economic development efforts and programs. JEDA should, to 
the extent possible, use CCIC staff to develop the plan and compile data 
for performance indicators. 
8 JEDA should collect and analyze data, such as wage levels and job 
descriptions, that reflect the quality of jobs created. 
9 JEDA should use its SIC codes to determine what types of businesses are 
obtaining JEDA loans and if this reflects statewide economic development 
priorities. 
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lO JEDA should analyze data on the geographical distribution of loans and 
determine if this reflects statewide economic development priorities. 
11 JEDA should survey client businesses to not only assess the impact of its 
loan programs on job creation, but also to assess quality of service and 
to determine if clients have unmet needs. 
The industrial development bond program (IDB) is another major 1EDA 
program. Our review found that IDBs allow businesses to obtain capital at 
below market rates when needed for a business expansion or to move into 
South Carolina. Since both the state and the federal government forgo 
revenue because of the tax -exempt status of these bonds, they are also 
expected to generate public benefits. We found that 1EDA's IDB program 
is not designed to meet key economic development goals. 
Section 41-43-100 of the South Carolina Code of Laws authorizes 1EDA to 
fund loans to businesses and non-profit corporations from the proceeds of 
tax-exempt revenue bonds. Tax-exempt bonds carry a lower interest rate and 
are more affordable than conventional loans. This program allows borrowers 
with capital needs of under $10 million to tap into the municipal bond 
market. In addition to manufacturing and industrial businesses, 1EDA can 
issue its bonds for non-profit corporations to include hospitals, nursing 
homes, and other organizations with recognized tax-exempt status under the 
federal tax code. Federal tax laws do not limit the amount of tax-exempt 
bond financing that can be issued for non-profit hospitals; other non-profit 
corporations are limited to $150,000,000 in tax-exempt bonds. 
JEDA reviews and approves projects as eligible for bond financing. The 
bond also must be approved by the State Budget and Control Board. 1EDA 
then issues its bonds to be purchased by an investment firm or commercial 
bank, and loans the proceeds of its bond sale to businesses for the 
acquisition, construction and/or expansion of proposed facilities. From 
December 1985 through September 1994, JEDA has issued 88 bonds for a 
total of $477,141,000. 
By state law, neither the full faith and credit nor the taxing power of the state 
or the issuer are pledged to secure the payment of the principal and interest 
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due. The bonds are payable only from the revenues generated by the 
project. JEDA acts primarily as a "conduit" and is not involved in 
repayments of the bond debt to the trustee bank. 
Most bonds are secured by a letter of credit (LOC) from a bank. If a bond 
defaults, the trustee bank deals with the borrower, the bondholders and the 
LOC bank to enforce the loan agreement. JEDA as issuer is involved only 
peripherally in a default. Of the 88 bonds issued, we found only three 
businesses had defaulted on their bonds. Three other manufacturers also had 
closed but were able to provide for bond payments. 
According to information provided by JEDA, all but five of its bonds were 
secured by a letter of credit or other type of credit enhancement from a bank. 
We reviewed the five bonds which were not secured by an LOC. Two bonds 
were backed by unconditional guarantees from parent corporations and 
carried a high rating; the other three bonds were for nursing homes and 
retirement centers and were secured by first liens on real estate, property and 
equipment. These three bonds were not rated. Disclaimers in the official 
documents disclose the risk factors associated with these bonds to potential 
bondholders. 
In the early 1980s, there was concern that small companies did not have 
access to capital markets to finance business expansions. Act 145 that 
created JEDA states, "Pooling of capital demands of businesses requires the 
creation of a statewide authority in order to aggregate the necessary volume 
of capital demand to access the large fmancial markets and reduce the cost 
to each participating business." 
If a small company needed capital financing of $1 million or less, this 
amount might be too small to access the bond market on its own. At the 
same time, interest rates on a conventional bank loan would be too high. 
JEDA was able to issue "pooled" or composite bonds which pooled the 
financing for several small companies at one time into one large bond, and 
spread the up-front costs among the several borrowers. JEDA is the only 
South Carolina economic development agency with the authority to issue 
composite IDBs. 
However, JEDA has issued only stand-alone bonds since 1990, and most of 
these have been for multi-million dollar projects. According to JEDA 
officials, they no longer issue composite bonds for several reasons, including 
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the complexity of arranging the composites and changes in the market which 
made conventional fmancing more attractive to small businesses. 
If the conditions which necessitated the creation of IEDA's bond program 
have changed, then the need for IEDA to continue issuing bonds should be 
re-evaluated. In addition, under federal tax laws states have a "state ceiling .. 
limiting the amount of private activity, tax-exempt bonds they can issue. 
JEDA competes with several other entities for allotments under the state 
ceiling, which was $178,000,000 in FY 92-93. 
Counties have had the authority to issue industrial development revenue 
bonds for at least 20 years before this authority was given to IEDA also. 
The State Housing Finance and Development Authority and the State 
Education Assistance Authority also issue tax -exempt bonds which are 
allotted under the state ceiling. The State Budget and Control Board 
determines which bonds are approved, usually on a first-come, first-served 
basis. From FY 85-86 through FY 92-93, JEDA's share of private activity, 
tax-exempt bonds ranged from 2% to 23% of the state ceiling. 
Also, most borrowers in JEDA's bond program would have been eligible for 
a conventional bank loan, since bonds are usually secured by a LOC from a 
bank. A letter of credit provides security for the investors and also lowers 
the interest rate to the borrower. Businesses have to be financially sound in 
order to obtain a LOC. This raises the question of whether the state should 
be forgoing tax revenues, and using limited tax-exempt revenue bonds, for 
businesses which might be able to obtain financing from private institutions. 
All tax-exempt state and local bonds (not just JEDA's) issued from FY 92-93 
through FY 94-95 comprised approximately $104,821,000 in lost state 
revenues. The state's economic development needs may be better served by 
prioritizing uses for tax-exempt fmancing (seep. 62). 
In 1990 and 1991 the fate of the tax-exempt industrial development bond 
program was uncertain because of the U.S. Congress's failure to permanently 
authorize it. During this time JEDA began to issue more hospital bonds, 
which have permanent legislation and are not included under the state's 
ceiling. 
Also, as South Carolina's elderly population continues to grow, JEDA has 
been called upon to issue more retirement center bonds. The number of state 
residents over age 65 is projected to increase 25% by the year 2000, 
according to 1990 census data. 
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However, it is questionable whether issuing bonds for health care facilities 
such as hospitals, nursing homes and retirement centers supports JEDA's 
mission to create jobs. These bonds usually result in little job creation 
compared to the size of the issue. For example, nine health care and 
retirement facility bonds have been issued by JEDA since 1990, accounting 
for 38% of the dollar volume for all JEDA bonds. The amount of financing 
for eacb new job created by these facilities averaged $176,512. 
Tax-exempt bonds are expected to generate public benefits in return for the 
reduction in state and federal revenues. As discussed on page 10, 18% of 
businesses with bond financing failed to create new jobs, and most of the 
jobs claimed by JEDA for this program are in fact retained jobs. Bonds are 
an expensive way to create new jobs compared to other JEDA programs. For 
example, JEDA has followed a benchmark of $10,000 per job for its CDBG 
direct loan program. Recently this was changed to $25,000 per job. For 
bond financing, the average cost per new job was $102,425; for both 
retained and new jobs it was $38,083. JEDA's bond program is the least 
efficient way to expand employment opportunities. 
Other economic development goals, such as targeting small companies or 
encouraging investment in economically distressed counties, are not achieved 
by the bond program. Only 7% of JEDA's bond financing bas been for 
businesses locating in historically distressed counties. The impact of 
industrial development bonds on economic development goals is. also 
discussed on page 22. 
12 JEDA should reevaluate the need for its composite bond program. 
13 JEDA should review its need to issue health care facility bonds in view 
of the low job creation associated with such bonds. 
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Export development programs are viewed as providing considerable 
economic advantage. In addition to new jobs and increases in tax revenues 
created by growth in exports, the diversified nature of the world economy 
makes export trade a valuable hedge against domestic economic downturns. 
Exports bring in new dollars, rather than shifting dollars within jurisdictions. 
However, while promoting the export of South Carolina products remains a 
desirable economic development goal, we found that JEDA's programs may 
not be effective in this area. 
JED A's export program was created to promote the export of South Carolina 
products. Section 41-43-70 of the South Carolina Code of Laws directs 
JEDA to: 
. .. encourage and assist through loans, investments, research, technical 
and managerial advice, studies, data compilation and dissemination ... 
the promotion of the export of goods, services, commodities, and capital 
equipment produced within the state, so as to provide maximum 
opportunities for creation and retention of jobs . • • . 
This is the only program operated by JEDA that is specifically mandated by 
statute. 
The program is composed of: Consulting Services; Export Marketing 
Facilitation Services, i.e. helping exporters to access credit reporting 
services; Foreign Credit Insurance Association (FICA) umbrella insurance; 
Eximbank programs; and Export Working Capital Guarantee (EWCG), that 
provide pre-export working capital loan guarantees. Under the EWCG 
eligible businesses obtain working capital to be used in filling an export 
order. CCIC provides a guarantee for up to 85% of the loan amount, not to 
exceed $170,000, using a line of credit established with four banks. 
Since the export financing initiative was established in 1989, only five 
guarantees have been made; two went to the same company. 
The maximum limit of $170,000 may not be sufficient capital to attract 
business interest. According to the United States Department of Commerce 
(DOC), South Carolina's top export products for 1994 were equipment, 
machinery and chemicals, industries dominated by large businesses whose 
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needs may therefore exceed JEDA's EWCG program's financing abilities. 
JEDA has the authority to use program funds for this program but cannot use 
state general fund appropriations. 
Also, the authority has devoted few resources to export promotion. Based 
on cost recovery computations from CCIC, the export program is less than 
2.03% of CCIC's total cost. The one staff person assigned to this program 
is the executive vice-president and chief operating officer of CCIC. He is 
also responsible for the day-to-day operations of CCIC. 
Using the United States Department of Commerce (DOC) multiplier formula, 
the most jobs that could be attributed to the EWCG initiative is 17. JEDA 
does not know if jobs resulted from other initiatives. This is a very small 
portion of the overall export jobs created in South Carolina. According to 
1993 statistics from the DOC, South Carolina exports increased by $2.5 
billion (147%) from 1987 to 1992, which equals the creation of 50,000 
manufacturing jobs. 
JEDA identifies the Consulting Service as the most active part of the 
program, resulting in approximately 48 business meetings and approximately 
28 foreign business prospects each year. Activities under Export Marketing 
Facilitation were limited to assisting five businesses in obtaining credit 
reports and approximately six businesses in obtaining insurance. The official 
responsible for the program stated that the best use of his time is in getting 
exposure to large audiences. 
The need for JEDA's program is questionable because two federal programs, 
with local offices and accessibility to exporters, offer more extensive 
services. The Small Business Administration (SBA), provides export 
financing in the amounts of $750,000 or less, and the federal Eximbank's 
program serves companies with needs in excess of $750,000. The 
Eximbank's goal is, in part, to facilitate export financing of U.S. goods and 
services by absorbing reasonable credit risks that are beyond the current 
reach of the private sector. The Eximbank financed over $15 billion in 
export assistance to U.S. exporters in 1994. 
SBA uses loans to finance export marketing advice, legal consultations, 
foreign business travel and participation in foreign trade shows. Guaranty 
Pqel9 LAC/JEDA-93-l Johs-Ecouomic Developmmt Aadaorib' 
Recommendations 
Palmetto Basic 
Building Fund 
Chapter 2 
Economic Development Goals 
programs and a revolving line of credit are also available as well as 
development assistance including training, counseling, referrals to exporting 
service providers and reference materials. 
14 JEDA should carry out its statutory responsibility in the export program 
to provide research, technical and managerial advice, studies, data 
compilation and dissemination. 
15 JEDA should evaluate the implementation of its export program and 
determine whether current initiatives should be continued as presently 
structured. Performance goals should be established to include: 
• The dollar value of actual increased export sales from client firms. 
• The number of actual jobs created from exports. 
• The number and percentage of firms that began or increased export 
trade sales and production as a result of assistance. 
The Palmetto Basic Building Fund (PBBF) was created to provide loans to 
local, non-profit economic development corporations (LDCs) for the purpose 
of constructing speculative industrial buildings. A speculative (spec) 
industrial building is constructed without a specific tenant in mind but with 
the expectation that it will be purchased in the future. 
A major goal of the PBBF program was to create jobs for workers displaced 
as a result of Hurricane Hugo (September 1989). This justification is 
questionable. According to a report prepared by the State Budget and 
Control Board's Division of Research and Statistics, while there was job loss 
associated with Hurricane Hugo, "[m]ost of the negative impact on 
employment directly attributable to Hugo was short-lived." The first PBBF 
building was not sold until 1993, approximately four years after Hurricane 
Hugo struck the state. 
As of May 1994, JEDA had made five loans totalling approximately 
$1.8 million. However, only two of the five buildings constructed under the 
program have been sold, and as of February 1995, only 15 jobs created. 
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A 1991 article in the Economic Development Review states that, before 
beginning a spec building program, ". . . it is important to measure both the 
market demand and supply for additional industrial buildings." Only if the 
existing inventory of buildings is found to be inconsistent with the 
requirements of the marketplace should development of a spec building 
program begin. According to officials involved in the creation of the 
program, no study or analysis was done to determine the need for additional 
spec buildings in the state. 
Prior to Hugo, South Carolina had 257 industrial buildings which were 
available for occupancy. As of July 1994, the state had 291 available 
buildings including 22 spec buildings. JEDA's program is not the only 
source of spec buildings in the state. According to Department of Commerce 
figures from September 1994, 19 of the 26 available spec buildings in the 
state were constructed by private sector companies. 
JEDA's policy on collateral for the buildings is to allow principal and interest 
payments to be deferred for at least two years and up to five years. 
However, the accrued interest cannot exceed the value of the land upon 
which the building is constructed. Once the accrued interest does exceed the 
value of the land, the LDC is required to start making interest payments. 
However, if the properties are not sold within the five years, it is unlikely 
that the LDCs will have any means of repaying the loans. 
JEDA has already foreclosed on one loan incurring approximately $4,600 in 
expenses associated with the foreclosure on the building and future costs such 
as taxes and insurance. JEDA may not be able to collect 100% of the 
principal and interest due on the building when it is sold. During the course 
of our review, JEDA officials stated they intend to discontinue the PBBF 
program. 
16 JEDA should discontinue making new loans in the PBBF program. 
17 JEDA should review its collateral policy on loans to LDCs for industrial 
buildings to ensure that LDCs have the assets to make payments once the 
interest charges exceed the value of land used as collateral. 
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We reviewed both CDBG and CCIC loan files to assess effectiveness of 
lending policies in limiting JEDA's exposure and ensuring borrowers' 
eligibility. Within our sample of 16 CDBG loans and 12 CCIC loans, we 
found loans made to borrowers with substantial personal net worth (see 
Table 2.3). This is allowable under the present policy. 
The lending policies for both the CDBG and CCIC loan programs state that 
eligibility under these programs " ... is limited to private, 'for profit' 
enterprises with a net worth of less than $1 million and/or a net profit after 
taxes averaging less than 20% of net worth for the previous three years." 
JEDA officials stated that the "principal criteria for credit evaluation is the 
networth (sic) of the business and not the principals." 
We noted that in some instances these borrowers had created a new 
corporation or partnership whose net worth would qualify under the 
$1 million net worth limitation, as seen on the table below. While we 
understand that the businesses rather than the principals are receiving the 
loans, we cannot agree that providing low-cost capital to subsidize wealthy 
business owners is an appropriate use of public resources. 
A CCIC 1992 $33,736,718 $287,762* Yes 
8 CDBG 1992 $3,619,761 $500,000* Yes 
c CCIC 1992 $2.448,000 $200,000* Yes 
D CDBG 1990 $3,063,000 $175,000* No 
E# CDBG 1987 $7,200,000 $1,948,936. No 
F CDBG 1987 $1,820,878 $250,000* No 
G CDBG 1987 $1,568,000 $250,000* No 
H CDBG 1983 $4,119,500 $200,000 Yes 
Private funds were used in addition to these funds to provide for total project costs. 
# This company received three CDBG loans from JEDA. 
Source: JEDA/CCIC loan files. 
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HUD recently published new regulations (24 C.P.R. Part 570) for its CDBG 
program effective February 1995, including .. Guidelines and Objectives for 
Evaluating Project Costs and Financial Requirements." One guideline 
(Appendix A, paragraph IV ,3) states that the proposed projects should be 
reviewed to ". . . ensure that, to the extent practicable, CDBG funds will not 
be used to substantially reduce the amount of non-Federal financial support 
for the activity." 
While these guidelines were only recently formalized, the underlying premise 
of these types of loan programs has been that scarce public resources must 
leverage private funds in order for the programs to be successful. Therefore, 
borrowers who have the resources to either obtain private financing or 
provide funds of their own should not be allowed to substitute public funds 
in place of those funds. 
The following examples provide details of loans to borrowers with substantial 
personal net worth. 
Loan A 
This loan represents a CCIC loan made to four partners with a combined 
personal net worth totaling $33.8 million. The partnership was formed 
in order to own and operate a shopping center. A memo written by the 
loan officer to the loan committee stated that the "strength of the credit" 
precluded the use of CDBG funds. The memo appeared to indicate that 
approval of the loan would benefit CCIC's loan program which bad 
experienced a low volume of activity during the year. In addition, the 
loan was $87,762 over CCIC's loan limit of $200,000. 
In addition, minutes of a loan committee meeting held in October 1992 
show that this same partnership applied to CCIC some five months later 
for an additional loan in order to construct a drug store. CCIC's loan 
committee unanimously declined this request. The minutes state that 
"there were lengthy discussions regarding the principals' sizable net 
worth . . . and the amount of the loan request as compared to the 
principals' net worth.,. 
Page33 LAC/JEDA-93-l Jobs-Eeoaomil: DeYelopmeat Authority 
Recommendation 
Chapter 2 
Economic Development Goale 
LDanB 1 
This loan was a CDBG loan which involved protests from the local 
community regarding a loan being made to a textile manufacturing 
plant. When the public meeting was held to receive comments and 
questions about the loan, several owners of existing textile plants voiced 
concern over the additional competition for trained workers. 
LoanE l 
This company received three CDBG loans from JEDA. The third loan, 
made in 1987, refinanced the first two loans and provided an additional 
$1 million to the company. At the time this third loan was made, a 
compiled (unaudited) personal financial statement was provided to JEDA 
by the business' owner. According to this statement, the owner had a 
net worth of $7.2 million, including three residences totaling over 
$1.3 million. 
18 JEDA should develop appropriate policies to ensure that loans are not 
made to borrowers with substantial resources, where public funds may 
substitute for available private funds. 
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We found that JEDA and CCIC did not require adequate collateral or 
personal guarantees for several loans we reviewed. Current lending policies 
addressing these issues are vague and inconsistently applied, allowing for a 
variety of loan terms to be made depending on each individual project. 
We found evidence of what, in our opinion, constituted a distinct deficiency 
of collateral or other security. Our sample of 16 CDBG loans included 12 
(50%) of JEDA's 24 charged-off loans as of June 30, 1994; we found four 
cases where adequate collateral and/or personal guarantees were not obtained. 
The resulting loss to JEDA's loan fund was $1,357,893, representing 22% 
of the total amount charged off. In addition, we reviewed a judgmental 
sample of 12 (41 %) of the 29 loans made by CCIC as of June 30, 1994. 
This review included all categories of loans and revealed several concerns 
regarding insufficient collateralization of loans, as well as a personal 
guaranty provided by an inappropriate individual (see pp. 39, 42). 
Section 41-43-150(C)(6) of the South Carolina Code of Laws states that 
JEDA may authorize loans to eligible recipients only after it has determined 
that " ... the public interest is adequately protected by the terms of the 
agreements to be entered into in connection with the transaction." 
Current lending policies for JEDA's CDBG loan program state that "all direct 
loans or guarantees should be collateralized" and "personal guarantees from 
principals may be required." Current CDBG loan policies also require life 
insurance coverage on the company principals with assignment to JEDA. 
CCIC's current lending policies state that "all CCIC loans must be secured 
by collateral." Regarding personal guarantees, CCIC's policies state that 
they " ... could be required." 
These policies do not define specific terms for collateral or personal 
guarantees. JEDA provides "gap financing," and in many cases, must accept 
a second (or lower) position on the collateral provided, such as a second or 
third mortgage on land and buildings. However, if collateral is inadequate, 
the amount charged off for defaulted loans increases. Even though lending 
involves subjective decision making, the terms involving collateral and 
personal guarantees should be defined as specifically as possible. 
The following examples provide details of loans where, in our opinion, JEDA 
or CCIC should have taken a more conservative approach in adequately 
protecting loan funds. 
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Loan 1 l 
In 1987, a company received from JEDA a third CDBG loan which 
refinanced two existing CDBG loans and provided an additional 
$1,000,000. The terms of this loan required the principal to provide a 
personal guarantee ". . . in an amount equal to fifty percent (SO%) of 
the total indebtedness of the Business (sic) to JEDA." The terms did 
not require an assignment of life insurance on the principal. The loan 
defaulted by 1988, and after the death of the principal, JEDA was 
unable to collect the 50% guarantee. JEDA charged off a loan balance 
of $600,537 after selling the collateral obtained following the default. 
Loan 2 1 
In 1990, JEDA was asked to participate in a "trade finance transaction" 
involving a loan to a clothing manufacturer. The company was in debt 
in excess of $10 million. JEDA provided $500,000 in order to finance 
inventory purchases of winter clothes which were to be sold to various 
U.S. retailers. The credit request report prepared by JEDA describes 
the transaction as "fully collateralized" by the merchandise to be 
purchased. JEDA did not require any personal guarantees on the loan. 
The loan defaulted, and JEDA charged off a loan balance of $85,191 
indicating that the loan was not, in fact, fully collateralized. Our 
review of the file indicated that a substantial amount of staff time and 
resources were required in order to sell the merchandise. 
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Loan 3 
In 1990, JEDA made a $500,000 CDBG loan to a start-up agricultural 
business which later defaulted. A total of $463,105 was charged off in 
1993. In the weeks prior to the loan closing, the president of the 
corporation resigned his position in the midst of public disclosure 
concerning his conviction of drug-related crimes in Europe and returned 
all of his stock back to the corporation. Therefore, his personal 
guaranty was no longer available to JEDA. However, JEDA did obtain 
the corporate guaranty of a company located in Central America. 
During foreclosure proceedings against the company, contacts in Central 
America reported that the address given for the corporation did not 
exist, and it was their opinion that the corporation was a "ghost 
company." 
An interesting point regarding this loan was that during the negotiation 
process with the company, state law was changed to exempt all 
greenhouses from property taxes in order to lure this business to South 
Carolina. The South Carolina Department of Revenue estimates that the 
current revenue losses because of this change are approximately 
$500,000 annually. Therefore, actions taken to bring about this 
transaction continue to cost the state annually in the form of lost 
revenue. 
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Loan4 
In 1985, JEDA made a $250,000 CDBG loan to a company. Part of the 
transaction involved one of JEDA's board members conveying his 
interest in approximately eight acres of property located in an industrial 
park to JEDA. In response to our inquiries, JEDA officials stated that 
the land transferred to JEDA only served to provide additional collateral 
to better secure the loan. After the loan defaulted, JEDA charged off 
the loan balance of $209,060 in 1989. Prior to the charge-off, JEDA 
sold the parcel of land back to the board member for $5,000. We have 
not been able to determine why JEDA's loan committee would allow a 
board member to convey his personal property to JEDA as collateral for 
a loan. We do, however, doubt the appropriateness of the transaction. 
In addition, CCIC made a $25,000 "venture capital" loan in 1986 to the 
same company and did not require any collateral to secure the loan. 
Instead, a complex partnership arrangement was proposed where CCIC 
and a company employee would loan money to the business in exchange 
for ownership in the company. However, the business failed shortly 
after the CCIC loan was made. Correspondence in the loan file from 
CCIC's attorney who prepared loan and partnership documents for this 
transaction stated "From the beginning, I advised everyone that the 
transaction was too complicated for the amount of money involved. A 
routine secured loan would have been much simpler, safer, and less 
costly .... " 
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Loan5 
In 1984, in order to assist a failing textile business, a credit line of 
$100,000 was established at a local bank by one of JEDA's ex Officio 
board members, who personally guaranteed the transaction. These 
funds were made available to CCIC (formerly JOBEC) and CCIC, in 
tum, loaned the funds to the business. The financial outlook of the 
business continued to decline, and a year later another bank loan was 
obtained by CCIC in the amount of $100,000 which again was 
personally guaranteed by the same board member. The proceeds from 
this loan were also loaned to the business. 
Meanwhile, JEDA received a $1 million state appropriation which was 
transferred to CCIC by January 1986 (see further discussion on p. 42) 
thereby giving CCIC the financial autonomy to remove the personal 
guarantee of the board member. According to CCIC's loan portfolio 
analysis, a total of $400,000 was loaned to this business. However, the 
loan defaulted and CCIC charged off $134,119. It is inappropriate for 
a board member to personally guarantee bank notes in order to provide 
a loan to a business in a state-sponsored program. 
19 JEDA and CCIC should implement policies which more specifically 
define the terms of loan collateralization and personal guarantees, in 
order to ensure compliance with §41-43-150(C)(6) of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws concerning the protection of the public's interest when 
making loans to businesses. 
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We reviewed CCIC's lending policy and found that CCIC has no limit on the 
percent of a total project's cost that can be funded under its commercial loan 
program. Of the 30 loans made by CCIC as of October 31, 1994, we found 
13 cases (43%) where CCIC funded 100% of the project's cost. We found 
an additional four cases where CCIC funded more than 40% of the project's 
cost. 
According to CCIC's lending policy, its loans are intended to be made in 
conjunction with private lenders who want to limit their exposure. JEDA's 
lending policy for its CDBG program states that the amount of CDBG 
assistance shall not exceed 40% of a project's cost. Overall, we found that 
for every $1 of CDBG funds JEDA leveraged $3.45 of private money. For 
every $1 of CCIC loans, $1.67 in private financing was leveraged. 
State government should not provide a major part of the new capital needed, 
and should not replace the role played by private financial institutions. CCIC 
needs to use its funds as a stimulus to generate private financing for projects 
which would not have been undertaken otherwise. 
20 CCIC should establish a limit on the percentage of a project's total cost 
it will fund. 
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In our sample of 16 CDBG loans, we found a current loan where the 
borrowers may have spent loan proceeds inappropriately. JEDA's governing 
statutes state: 
Proceeds of loans under this section are utilized: (i) to acquire . . . land 
and buildings . . . machinery, equipment, office furnishings . . . or for 
research and design costs, legal and accounting fees . . . or (ii) for the 
research, testing, and developing of new products, machinery, 
equipment . . . and the initial marketing thereof. Loan proceeds also 
may be used to finance working capital [§41-43-160]. 
In 1986, JEDA made a CDBG loan to a business in the amount of $135,000. 
According to the loan agreement, the loan proceeds were to be used 
" ... for, and only for, the purposed acquisition of capital assets ... However, 
correspondence found in the loan file written by the borrower's attorney 
indicated that the purpose of the JEDA loan was to help settle a lawsuit 
against the business filed by its minority stockholder. 
According to correspondence found in the file, JEDA was aware the loan 
funds were to be disbursed by the borrower's attorney as follows. 
The first two items do not represent capital assets. Using a loan to pay off 
a lawsuit appears to violate JEDA' s statute regarding appropriate use of loan 
proceeds. 
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21 JEDA should ensure that loan proceeds are used in accordance with 
statutory requirements. 
JEDA's policy on ethical conduct is inadequate and CCIC by-laws do not 
contain a statement on ethical conduct. Also, JEDA has not established a 
formal process to implement its ethics policy. 
JEDA's by-laws contain a provision which prohibits considering loan 
applications where ". . . any Board member or any member of his immediate 
family (to include his/her spouse, their parents, their children, and their 
respective spouses) has a financial interest." 
This ethics statement was adopted by the JEDA board on October 24, 1990. 
Board minutes from prior meetings show that the original language proposed 
included staff members as well as board members. It appears that "staff" 
was deleted from the final version approved by the board. The staff should 
be included in the statement in order to avoid favoritism, or the appearance 
of such, in any of JEDA's loan programs. In addition, HUD regulation 24 
C.F .R. §570.489(h)(3), which prohibits conflicts of interest in its CDBG 
programs, states that the persons covered include employees of the state or 
unit of local government. 
Prior to the adoption of the ethics by-law, there were situations where board 
members were involved with loan recipients. In two instances, a board 
member personally provided either collateral or a personal guarantee for the 
loan. In both cases we were unable to determine a connection between the 
board member and the business. Another case involved a bond to a 
partnership in which a board member was a partner in the business. 
The integrity of small business loan programs may be compromised if even 
the appearance of favoritism is present. Therefore, a comprehensive policy 
to identify potential conflicts of interest may be necessary. This policy could 
include the development of internal guidelines for polling board and staff 
members to determine whether they are related to loan applicants. 
After JEDA reviewed our draft report, the board on May 18, 1995, amended 
their ethics policy to include staff members in its provisions. They are in the 
process of amending their by-laws. 
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22 JEDA should include staff members in the provision in its by-laws which 
prohibits the consideration of loan applications of parties related to board 
members. JEDA's policy could include guidelines for polling board and 
staff members. 
23 CCIC should amend its by-laws to include a statement on ethical conduct 
similar to that found in JEDA's by-laws. 
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on administration to 
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This chapter addresses administrative and management issues. These include 
possible statutory violations where state administrative funds have been used 
to capitalize CCIC's revolving loan fund. In addition, we found 
administrative overcharges made by both JEDA and CCIC. Some 
expenditures may be unnecessary. We found problems in a contract for 
lobbying and a strategic plan, in CCIC's lack of a written investment policy, 
and in policy for recordkeeping and retention. 
As previously noted, JEDA continues to receive state funds even though the 
Governor recommended in 1992 that they be phased out within two years. 
In FY 94-95, JEDA received $125,000 in general funds and is budgeted to 
receive this amount again in FY 95-96. These funds are not appropriated 
directly to JEDA but instead are appropriated to the State Budget and Control 
Board's Division of Local Government which then transfers the funds to 
JEDA. 
JEDA has used state appropriations not spent on administrative expenses to 
capitalize CCIC's revolving loan fund (RLF). This may be a violation of 
JEDA's enabling legislation. Also, JEDA should have used these funds to 
meet federal matching requirements for administrative expenses rather than 
continuing to receive state appropriations. We estimate that JEDA used 
$583,000 in state appropriated funds not spent on administration to capitalize 
CCIC's revolving loan fund. 
Section 41-43-50 states, "The authority shall retain unexpended funds at the 
close of the state fiscal year . . . and expend the funds in subsequent fiscal 
years." Section 41-43-20(c) defines administrative funds as "all monies, 
received by the authority from the general fund of the state . . . which are 
designated specifically to be used for payment of administrative expenses." 
Evidence indicates the state appropriated funds were for administrative 
purposes. Also, §41-43-220 of JEDA's enabling legislation states, "The 
authority must not incur any obligations, other than obligations related to 
administrative expenses, payable out of administrative funds. All other 
obligations are payable solely from program funds." 
In FY 92-93 and FY 93-94 JEDA received $762,000 in state-appropriated 
funds. We estimate $179,000 was used to fund operating costs. The 
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remaining $583,000 was placed in CCIC's loan fund. As of January 31, 
1995, CCIC had a cash balance of $888,500. 
JEDA may be violating its statute by allowing CCIC to use state 
appropriations meant for administrative expenses to fund business loans. In 
addition, JEDA continues to receive state appropriations when it should have 
used the unexpended state funds from FY 92-93 and FY 93-94. 
24 JEDA should require CCIC to return to JEDA state appropriations used 
to fund CCIC's revolving loan fund. 
25 JEDA should use cash balances to meet its federal matching requirements 
for the CDBG program. 
26 The General Assembly may wish to consider requiring JEDA to repay the 
state's general fund the $125,000 appropriated in FY 94-95 for the 
purpose of funding JEDA's operations. 
27 The General Assembly may wish to consider deferring JEDA's state 
appropriations for FY 95-96 and subsequent years until the remaining 
state appropriations from FY 92-93 and FY 93-94 have been expended. 
Under the CDBG program, a local government receives a grant from JEDA's 
CDBG revolving loan fund which in tum is loaned by the local government 
to a company. In order to recover its administrative costs associated with 
making the loan to the company, CCIC charges the local government an 
administrative fee based on a percentage of the loan. This fee is designed to 
cover the up-front costs associated with making the loan. CCIC also receives 
a separate monthly fee to cover ongoing loan servicing costs. 
In September 1993, HUD reviewed the administrative fee structure used by 
CCIC to recover its administrative costs and found that CCIC was not 
adequately documenting its charges. CCIC hired a consultant (Williams, 
Adley & Co.) to determine the appropriate administrative fee structure. We 
reviewed the administrative fee structure between JEDA and CCIC and found 
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it bas not correctly accounted for the administrative costs of the CDBG 
program. 
First, we found that the consultant included the salaries and benefits of two 
JEDA employees as a CCIC cost. However, during our review, we found 
that CCIC did not actually pay the costs associated with the two JEDA 
employees. As a result, CCIC recovered $204,589 more than it was entitled 
to from the CDBG revolving loan fund. 
Second, we found the consultant hired by JEDA/CCIC improperly included 
the costs of loan servicing in the administrative charge for the up-front costs. 
Thus, loan servicing costs were paid twice, once as part of the up-front fee 
and again when CCIC collected its monthly loan servicing fee. We estimate 
that CCIC recovered from CDBG funds approximately $74,000 more than it 
was entitled to for these costs. 
Third, we found that CCIC also improperly paid for operating costs 
associated with the two JEDA employees. These operating costs, (rent, 
telephone, automobiles, etc.) were included as part of CCIC's up-front costs 
and amounted to approximately $67,000. However, these costs should have 
been paid by JEDA from administrative funds. 
During the course of our review, JEDA officials stated they intended to 
refund the CDBG RLF for the excess cost recovery associated with these 
items. 
We also found administrative overcharges in two other loan programs we 
reviewed. JEDA did not properly account for the administrative costs 
associated with the Minority Loan Program (MLP). The MLP was created 
to help small and minority businesses expand using CDBG funds. Under a 
contract that ended in May 1992 with Division of Economic Development in 
the Governor's office, JEDA was to help review loan applications and service 
the loans. JEDA was to provide DED with an accounting of all costs 
incurred no later than September 30 of each year, as well as at the end of the 
contract, and would be reimbursed for costs up to $75,000 for the contract 
period of April 1990 through May 1992. 
In April 1991, DED approved JEDA's request to use MLP funds to pay for 
various general expenses, even though, according to HUD officials, CDBG 
funds should only be used to pay for actual, documentable expenses 
associated with the CDBG program. Three loans were made under the 
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program totalling $260,000. JEDA received the entire $75,000 in 
administrative funds. Effectively, JEDA charged an administrative rate of 
29%, compared to CCIC's 1992 rate of 12.5%. This is $42,500 more than 
CCIC would have charged. 
JEDA's administrative charges under the PBBF program are also 
questionable. Loans to construct buildings under the program are funded 
using a 50/50 match of Economic Development Administration {EDA) and 
CDBG funds. JEDA collected an administrative fee of 12.5% of the CDBG 
loan amount, totalling approximately $50,000. Based on the study done by 
JEDA's consultant, we estimated that JEDA's actual costs for administering 
the program were about $37,330. Thus, it appears JEDA may have collected 
$12,000 more than it actually cost to administer the program. 
CCIC has not received all fees due under the management and servicing 
agreement between CCIC and JEDA. From July 1992 through February 
1995, we estimate CCIC was owed approximately $161,000 by JEDA. 
Under Article 8 of the management and servicing agreement, CCIC agreed 
to perform the duties associated with issuing IDBs as well as other duties. 
In exchange for CCIC performing these functions, JEDA agreed to pay CCIC 
all compensation JEDA received for these services. Article 10 of the 
agreement states that the agreement can only be modified in writing. 
However, there was no written amendment to the management and servicing 
agreement, and CCIC has not received a total of$161,000 that it should have 
received. This results in less money available for CCIC to loan to 
businesses. CCIC is also essentially performing services for JEDA free of 
charge. 
28 JEDA/CCIC should review administrative charges for the CDBG program 
to ensure that they are appropriate. 
29 JEDA/CCIC should reimburse the CDBG revolving loan fund for any 
administrative overcharges. 
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30 JEDA should review its administrative charges for the Minority Loan and 
Palmetto Basic Building Fund program. If the actual administrative costs 
for the programs do not amount to the amount of funds received, 
JEDA should reimburse the proper entities for the difference. 
31 JEDA should pay to CCIC all fees due under the management and 
servicing agreement. 
32 Any modifications to the management and servicing agreement should be 
performed in writing as required by the agreement. 
Both JEDA and CCIC are public agencies, using public funds, and were 
created for a public purpose. We reviewed both JEDA's and CCIC's 
expenditures for appropriateness as to public purpose, concentrating on 
travel, club memberships, benefits, and miscellaneous purchases over a four-
year period from FY 90-91 through FY 93-94. While our review of these 
expenditures did not find infractions of state requirements, we identified 
some purchases which might be an unnecessary or wasteful use of public 
funds. 
• The JEDA and CCIC boards in April 1994 held a two-hour board 
meeting in Charleston and also toured two agricultural facilities there 
which received CDBG loans. Total cost for the 14 board members and 
staff was about $6,735, including $1,049 for a dinner cruise, $2,739 for 
hotel, $1,035 for transportation in the Charleston area and $1,912 for 
mileage, per diem, and other meals. These expenses were paid from 
both JEDA and CCIC accounts. 
The cost for the dinner cruise exceeded the state's $20 a day in-state 
meal allowance. In addition, alcoholic drinks were purchased as part of 
the dinner cruise; according to the comptroller general's office, while it 
is not a written policy the state normally does not pay for the purchase 
of alcoholic beverages. 
• CCIC pays dues and meal costs for JEDA's executive director's 
membership in the Capital City Club, for a total of $5,901 for the four-
year period. CCIC also pays dues and meal costs for JEDA's executive 
director's membership in the Rotary Club, amounting to $660 in 1993 
and 1994. Economic development agencies may need to maintain a 
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membership in business clubs in order to meet with clients. However, 
membership in the Rotary Club normally would not be reimbursed by the 
state, according to the comptroller general's office. 
• JEDA's executive director and the staff of CCIC (22) received extra 
disability insurance from CCIC. They also receive state disability 
benefits. The total annual premium for the disability insurance paid by 
CCIC is approximately $3,640. 
• JEDA and CCIC paid monthly fees totalling approximately $5,400 for the 
watering and care of indoor office plants over the four-year period. 
They also spent $1,773 during this time for floral arrangements bought 
for the office and for staff, board members, and family members. 
33 JEDA should discontinue unnecessary or wasteful purchases. 
We reviewed payments made to lobbyists by JEDA and CCIC. Although the 
lobbyists were working on JEDA's behalf, they were hired and paid by 
CCIC. 
From January through June 1992, CCIC paid The Fontaine Company 
$30,000 for a transition plan and $46,332 in lobbying and consulting fees. 
From May 1993 through June 1994, CCIC paid a second lobbyist a total of 
$17,000. This lobbyist currently is on a $2,000 a month retainer. 
Our review found problems with the manner in which The Fontaine 
Company was selected, and with the "transition plan" that resulted from this 
project. 
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Originally, the CCIC board published a request for proposal (RFP) for a 
"Strategic Plan" to be developed and implemented by a management 
consulting firm. The strategic plan was to help JEDA clarify its objectives 
and to identify what programs would be needed by businesses in the state. 
Four firms submitted proposals. All four proposals outlined the planning 
procedures that should be followed, including: formulating a mission 
statement, goals and objectives; surveying JEDA and CCIC staff; analyzing 
applicable federal and state legislation; collecting economic and financial 
data; and identifying needs and sources of capital, etc. 
Fontaine was approved even though its bid was the highest at $95,000. The 
other three firms, all major accounting firms, had bids ranging from $28,600 
to $91,200. 
When Fontaine was awarded the project on December 23, 1991, the JEDA 
and CCIC boards changed the entire nature of the project. The consultant 
was instead directed to develop a "transition plan" to help JEDA become a 
self-sufficient enterprise agency. CCIC agreed to pay $30,000 for the 
transition plan and also authorized Fontaine to act as a lobbyist to implement 
the plan at a cost of $150 an hour. 
CCIC was exempt from the State Procurement Code when it purchased these 
services. If the procurement code had applied, however, then CCIC would 
not have been able to change the nature and scope of the project without 
giving the other bidders a chance to respond. 
Currently, both JEDA and CCIC have their own purchasing manual. It 
exempts the procurement of professional services from solicitation 
requirements. However, when an RFP is made, CCIC's manual states: 
. . . eligible offerors shall be afforded the opportunity to submit best and 
final proposals if negotiations with any other offerer would result in a 
material alteration to the Request for Proposals and such alteration would 
have a cost consequence that could alter the order of offerors' price 
quotations contained in their initial proposals. 
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One month elapsed between the time The Fontaine Company was awarded 
the bid and the transition plan was presented to the JEDA and CCIC boards. 
The four-page plan called for changes in JEDA's legislation that would allow 
it to generate a higher level of fees from its CDBG program income. The 
consultant recommended specific changes in JEDA's legislation and that 
JEDA be made exempt from the state's personnel and procurement 
procedures. The transition plan did not perform most of the functions 
outlined in the proposals submitted to the CCIC board. In effect, it merely 
listed what the agency needed to lobby for in order w generate its own 
income. 
Because the actual work produced was different than what was bid, we could 
not determine if the $30,000 paid for Fontaine's plan was appropriate. 
Changing the scope and nature of a project after it is awarded makes it 
difficult to ensure that the project was awarded w the most qualified bidder. 
According to JEDA and CCIC officials, Fontaine's plan was successfuUy 
implemented and forms the basis for JEDA's present operations. JEDA has 
yet w develop a "strategic plan" that would guide its economic development 
activities in general (seep. 19). 
CCIC also paid The Fontaine Company $46,332 for lobbying and consulting 
fees from January 1992 through June 1992. In CCIC's "Lobbyist Principal 
Disclosure Statement" covering the nine months from January through 
September 1992, it reported wtal lobbying expenditures of only $15,079. 
Board minutes from January 22, 1992, state, "The Fontaine Company would 
act as a lobbyist w get the essential legislation passed at a cost of $150.00 
per hour." We could not determine what portion of the $46,332 paid to 
Fontaine in getting JEDA's legislation passed could be attributed to actual 
time spent lobbying members of the General Assembly. 
Section 2-17 et seq. of the South Carolina Code of Laws on lobbyists and 
lobbying was amended effective January 1992. The law requires a lobbyist's 
principal (such as CCIC) to report all income paid to lobbyists. 
CCIC did report the entire $17,000 paid to a second lobbyist within the past 
two years. 
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34 When it needs to acquire consulting services in the future, JEDA should 
ensure that CCIC follows the policies in its purchasing manual. 
35 CCIC should accurately record and report the amounts it spends on 
lobbying. 
JEDA has not established written criteria for loan administrators. In 
addition, JEDA does not inform borrowers in writing that they may use an 
administrator other than CCIC. Section 41-43-160 states that JEDA shall, 
"Require as a condition of each loan made . . . that the loan must be 
serviced by a loan administrator which meets criteria established by the 
authority. " 
According to JEDA officials, no written criteria have been established. In 
instances where a borrower wants to use a loan administrator other than 
CCIC, JEDA would examine the loan administrator to ensure the entity is 
capable of performing the administrative functions. Also, according to JEDA 
officials, JEDA does inform local governments that they may choose a loan 
administrator other than CCIC. However, this is not done in writing. 
36 JEDA should establish, through regulation, criteria for loan 
administrators. 
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According to §41-43-150, when approving loans JEDA is " ... entitled to 
rely upon its own investigation or upon such information and evidence 
furnished to it by recipient businesses . . . as the authority considers 
appropriate." 
Over the years, IEDA has developed various loan and bond guidelines and 
policies which outline the required documentation to be submitted by 
applicants to its programs or to be developed by the authority's staff. We 
reviewed selected files for the CDBG loan program, the CCIC loan program 
and the industrial revenue bond program for compliance with internal policies 
regarding file documentation. In addition, we reviewed and utilized several 
reports prepared by IEDA in connection with its programs. 
Since HUD periodically monitors the CDBG program, some external 
oversight of loan documentation does exist for this program. Therefore, our 
review of the CDBG loan files was not as detailed as our review of the CCIC 
files regarding specific documentation. The CCIC loan program has no in-
depth external review (except independent financial audits) regarding loan 
documentation and compliance with internal lending policies. IEDA's role 
in the bond program, for the majority of cases, does not include an 
evaluation of the creditworthiness of the borrowers. However, JEDA does 
require some documentation from the borrowers, primarily to determine if 
the project is viable. We found several instances of inadequate 
documentation in CCIC loan files and in bond files. In addition, we found 
that one bond file was missing. 
Lack of Proper Documentation in CCIC Loan Files 
In our sample of 12 CCIC loan files we found 2 files that did not contain 
evidence of a complete credit analysis based on required documentation. For 
one, no credit write-up was prepared. The second loan file did not contain 
borrowers' financial information to be used for a credit analysis. This loan 
eventually was charged off in the amount of $134,119. CCIC's lending 
policy states that potential borrowers must submit extensive information to 
CCIC including historical and projected fmancial information for the 
business, personal financial statements of the principals, and a description of 
projected job creation or retention. This documentation is used by the 
lending staff to evaluate the creditworthiness of the applicants. 
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Bond Files Incomplete 
While JEDA is not responsible for analyzing the creditworthiness of all 
participants, the underwriting criteria for the bond program require each 
company to provide documentation concerning the project to be funded. 
Examples of information required are an accounting of project costs, a 
market analysis, a business plan and job creation projections. In a sample 
of 27 bond files reviewed, 17 (63%) had missing documentation. This 
includes 12 that were lacking enough documentation to determine the 
outcome of the project, whether it was being monitored, or whether the 
bonds were still in force. Also, one application file for a company that had 
received a bond was missing. 
We found that JEDA does not maintain a central inventory of assets that have 
been recovered when a business defaults on a loan. Section 41-43-230 of the 
South Carolina Code of Laws states, "The authority may dispose of any 
property acquired by it on terms and conditions considered appropriate. The 
authority is not required to advertise property or take bids thereon." 
Therefore, JEDA has sole discretion in the handling and disposition of these 
assets. During our review of charged-off loans, we found several instances 
where JEDA had taken title to certain assets including a factory (land, 
building and contents), inventory consisting of winter clothing, and a parcel 
of land once belonging to a JEDA board member. We were informed by 
JEDA officials that information concerning these assets is found only in the 
individual loan files and not in one central place. Good business practices 
dictate that in order to better safeguard such assets and maintain better 
accounting controls over them, JEDA should keep a central inventory (listing) 
of assets which they have seized. This listing should specifically identify the 
assets, give the location and approximate market value of the assets and the 
intended disposition. 
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We found misleading information on JEDA's Loan Portfolio Analysis report. 
This report contains basic information concerning each loan and is used to 
update the outstanding loan balances each month. This report is used by the 
independent auditor in evaluating JEDA's loan receivable balance, and 
information from this document is provided to JEDA's Board of Directors. 
During our review of the CDBG asset securitization (seep. 15), we noted 
that many of the loans listed in the paid off category are loans which were 
part of the securitization transaction. However, there is no notation on the 
portfolio which identifies these loans as such. This lack of information, in 
our opinion, distorts the portfolio. Without any additional information, a 
user of this report may assume that all loans in the paid off category were 
fully paid off in accordance with the loan terms, or were paid off earlier than 
anticipated. In reality, the majority of these loans have not been paid off. 
They have simply been moved to another loan portfolio which CCIC manages 
for the purchaser of the loans. Due to the number of users of this report, it 
is important that it contain reliable, consistent information. 
37 JEDA should institute quality control measures to ensure that adequate 
documentation is included in all loan and bond flies. 
38 In order to better safeguard assets and maintain better accounting controls 
over them, JEDA should maintain a central inventory of assets which 
they have seized. 
39 JEDA should indicate in its CDBG loan portfolio which loans were sold 
as part of the asset securitization transaction. 
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Records of the Carolina Capital Investment Corporation are not archived with 
the Department of Archives and History, in accordance with Title 30, 
Chapter 1 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, which governs the retention 
of public records. While records transmittal forms from Archives indicate 
some retention of CCIC correspondence, we found no documentation relating 
to the corporation's financial and loan transactions. 
The records officer for both JEDA and CCIC has informed us that both 
agencies previously followed the same retention schedules; however, new 
retention schedules will be developed for CCIC. In addition, the 
management and servicing agreement entered into between JEDA and CCIC 
states that CCIC's records are the property of JEDA. 
JEDA does not retain information on applicants who have been denied federal 
CDBG funds. According to a JEDA spokesperson, there is not enough office 
space to keep all the applications received. The federal government requires 
this information as a means of determining compliance with uniform program 
administration requirements. 
Federal regulations for FY 93-94 governing the CDBG program require states 
to submit data to HUD concerning the racial, ethnic and gender 
characteristics of those who apply for, participate in, or benefit from CDBG 
funding (24 C.F.R. §570.491). A spokesperson for the regional office of 
HUD stated that data on all applicants for CDBG funds, including those who 
were denied, should be retained for three years. A review of denied 
applications would be necessary in determining if JEDA has complied with 
federal law. According to a spokesperson for the Division of Economic 
Development, JEDA did not submit complete civil rights data for FY 93-94. 
If HUD decides to enforce the requirement, JEDA may be found in 
noncompliance. 
Furthermore, §41-43-150 of the South Carolina Code of Laws prohibits 
discrimination in the administration of its programs. Information related to 
applicants who have been denied funding for any of JEDA's programs is 
necessary to determine if the authority is in compliance with its statutes. 
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40 JEDA should ensure that records of CCIC are archived in accordance 
with Title 30, Chapter 1 of the South Carolina Code of Laws. 
41 JEDA should retain in its files for at least three years applications for 
program funding which have been denied. 
Both JEDA and CCIC do not give public notice of their loan committee 
meetings. Loan committee meetings are held monthly, or more often if 
necessary, to make decisions on potential loan contracts. In addition, 
meeting minutes reflect that both the JEDA and CCIC boards have taken 
action during executive session, in violation of the Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA). 
Section 30-4-80 of the FOIA requires that all public bodies give at least 24 
hours written public notice of their meetings. While both JEDA and CCIC 
boards comply with this requirement, their loan committees do not. We 
found documentation that an attorney acting as bond counsel for one of 
JEDA's transactions brought this issue of noncompliance to the attention of 
JEDA in April 1993. However, according to a JEDA official, loan 
committees still do not give public notice of their meetings. 
Section 30-4-70 prohibits a public body from voting in executive session. 
We reviewed minutes of JEDA and CCIC board meetings from 1990 through 
1993. We found four instances in which the JEDA board, during executive 
session, approved decisions of its loan committee and ratified these actions 
upon returning to open session. While the FOIA previously allowed a public 
body to take formal action in executive session and ratify the action in public 
session, the law was amended in 1987 to prohibit this. 
Section 41-43-60 of the South Carolina Code of Laws permits telephonic 
meetings ofJEDA's board. A review ofboth JEDA and CCIC loan committee 
minutes from January 1991 through December 1993 shows that a majority 
of meetings during that period, 90% and 78% respectively, were telephonic. 
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42 JEDA should ensure that FOIA requirements governing meetings are 
complied with by its own board, CCIC, and committees of either entity. 
CCIC has no written policy concerning the investment of funds. According 
to JEDA officials, the Board of Directors has, over the years, discussed 
various options and has always selected conservative investments. Currently, 
CCIC has eight bank accounts and two certificates of deposit. We found that 
three of the checking accounts can probably be closed due to lack of activity. 
Two of these accounts had no activity besides bank charges and interest 
income for FY 93-94. 
The assets of an organization, including cash, must be properly safeguarded 
by a system of internal controls. Appropriate internal controls would include 
the establishment of written policies directing the investment of cash. 
Written policies serve to clarify the specific objectives of management as well 
as direct the actions of staff. 
While we did not find any improprieties relative to the bank accounts, 
monitoring numerous accounts, including those with little or no activity, can 
be difficult. Unnecessary accounts should be eliminated to facilitate proper 
supervision of funds. 
43 CCIC's Board of Directors should establish a written investment policy. 
44 CCIC should close bank accounts which have had little activity and are 
unnecessary to normal operations. 
Page 59 LAC/JEDA-93-l Jobs-Ecooomic Developaaeot Authority 
Possible 
Alternative 
Investment Option 
Recommendation 
Chapter 3 
Administrative Issues 
The Office of the State Treasurer has an investment pool in which local 
governments invest public monies in excess of current needs. According to 
documentation provided by the treasurer's office, the pool has been earning 
between 3.23% and 5.89% over the past year. In addition, the pool allows 
participants access to their funds within one day. 
As of March 1995, bill No. 26 has been introduced in the Senate (and was 
referred to committee) which would amend §6-6-10 of the South Carolina 
Code of Laws to allow non-profit entities which provide contractual services 
to state agencies to participate in the investment pool of the state treasurer's 
office. It appears that this bill, if passed by the General Assembly, would 
allow CCIC access to the investment pool. 
45 CCIC's Board of Directors and management should consider investing in 
the investment pool maintained by the Office of the State Treasurer, if 
authorized by law to do so. 
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Gaps in the State's 
Capital Markets 
During the course of this audit we found several issues for further study. 
JEDA is part of the overall economic development program of the state; from 
this perspective, there are issues directly concerning JEDA which extend 
beyond the agency. 
Governor Riley and the Coordinating Council on Economic Development 
commissioned a study in 1985-Capital Markets and Economic DevelopmenJ 
in South Carolina: New Directions for State Policy. This study found that 
South Carolina was indeed a capital poor state. 
Since then, South Carolina has made progress in plugging some of these 
"capital gaps,. through the creation of new programs. For example, the 
Palmetto Seed Capital Corporation was created by state statute to supplement 
conventional fmancing for growth-oriented businesses. EDI is another 
program that spun-off from the Department of Commerce in 1989, and its 
mission is to identify and help develop resources for businesses and economic 
development. However, the economic development officials we interviewed 
in the course of this audit stated that "gaps,. still persist. 
According to the 1985 study, "JEDA suffers from having too broad a mission 
and inadequate as well as inappropriate capitalization . . . , .. and a more 
effective gap-filling role for JEDA would be to focus on leveraging private 
funds. We determined that, ten years later, JEDA uses its CDBG revolving 
loan fund to combine with private investment for a ratio of 1:3.45. 
However, JEDA's direct loan programs may not be large enough to pull in 
the amount of private funds needed. JEDA also is hampered by HUD 
restrictions on the use of CDBG funds. It was beyond our scope to 
determine how far JEDA goes in filling the state's capital investment needs. 
Another new initiative in South Carolina, the Main Street Investment 
Program, uses SBA loan guarantees and state deposits to encourage banks to 
make loans to small and start-up business. This program is a joint effort 
between the Office of the State Treasurer, the SBA, and the Department of 
Commerce. Other states, such as Mississippi and Alabama, also use state 
loan guarantee pools and linked deposits as strategies to leverage and/or buy 
down the cost of private financing. This may use limited public resources 
more effectively than a direct loan program. A fundamental goal should not 
be to replace private investment with public funds, but rather to stimulate 
private investment and financing. 
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Therefore, questions remain as to what capital gaps still exist in South 
Carolina, how far JEDA's programs can go in filling these gaps, and whether 
other economic development strategies being initiated in this state are more 
effective in leveraging private financing and targeting investment to where 
the greatest needs are. 
Tax-exempt bonds are a limited resource. Federal tax laws set a ceiling 
amount that states can issue so as to limit federal revenue losses. The state 
also loses state income tax revenue. We could not determine the amount lost 
through the tax-exempt revenue bonds; however, total state tax losses over 
a three-year period for all tax-exempt bonds (this includes revenue bonds as 
well as general obligation) are estimated at $104,821,000. 
As previously noted JEDA is not the only entity which has the ability to issue 
tax-exempt revenue bonds. The State Housing and Development Authority, 
the State Education Assistance Authority, and all South Carolina counties 
also can issue tax-exempt "private activity" bonds which must be allocated 
under the state ceiling or volume cap. Section 1-11-510 to 520 of the South 
Carolina Code of Laws requires the Budget and Control Board to make these 
allocations. Generally, 60% of the tax-exempt revenue bonds available under 
the state volume cap is set aside for counties; 40% for state-level authorities. 
The State Budget and Control Board has the authority to shift unallocated 
funds from one group to the other. According to JEDA officials, available 
funds are then allocated on a first-come, first-served basis. 
In view of this, state-level priorities may need to be set on the use of tax-
exempt revenue bonds that are allocated under the state ceiling. We found 
that the IDBs issued by JEDA are not well-suited to meet key economic 
development goals such as job creation and investment in poor counties. 
State allocation policy should be reviewed to ensure it best serves the overall 
economic development needs of the state. Furthermore, JEDA has moved 
away from the role envisioned for its bond program-that of pooling the 
capital needs of smaller companies into a single bond issue. The feasibility 
of and need for this kind of financing needs to be studied. 
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46 The Department of Commerce, in conjunction with new statewide 
strategic planning initiatives, should consider what capital gaps still exist 
in South Carolina, how far JEDA's programs can go in filling these gaps, 
and what other economic development strategies should be developed that 
could be most effective in leveraging private investment. 
47 The State Budget and Control Board or the Office of the State Treasurer 
may wish to study setting priorities for the use of tax-exempt private 
activity bonds that are allocated under the state ceiling. 
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Appendix A 
Audit Scope and Methodology 
The scope of our review began with the establishment of Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority (JEDA) and its corporate activities from 1983 
through 1994, depending on our assessment of data, particularly loan 
information. The primary programs reviewed were: the Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) economic development loan program; the 
Carolina Capital Investment Corporation (CCIC) direct loan program; JED A's 
tax -exempt Industrial Development Bond Program; the Palmetto Basic 
Building Fund (PBBF); JEDA's Export Program; and the Minority Loan 
Program. The primary criteria we used to measure program implementation 
were federal and state laws and associated regulations. 
Our audit methodology included an analysis of JEDA/CCIC program records, 
financial data, board minutes, and policies and procedures. We interviewed 
JEDA and CCIC personnel as well as personnel associated with the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), the Small Business 
Administration, the South Carolina Business Development Corporation, local 
government CDBG programs, the South Carolina Department of Commerce, 
and the Governor's Division of Economic Development. We reviewed 
research in the area of economic development provided by numerous state 
and national entities, including Council of State Community Development 
Agencies, the Urban Institute and the General Accounting Office. 
We reviewed various internal controls in the lending and loan administration 
areas. In our review of JEDA and CCIC loans, we relied on sampling 
techniques discussed in applicable sections of the report. We chose 12 of the 
16 CDBG loans in one sample from those which had been charged off as 
uncollectible, in order to focus on problem loans. Most charged-off loans 
had been originated before FY 88-89; this reflects the fact that parts of our 
review focus on agency actions that have occurred more than five years ago. 
Another sample of 24 CDBG loans was reviewed to verify JEDA's claims of 
job creation; also a sample of 12 CCIC loans was reviewed. 
For our analysis of defaulted and charged-off loans, we did not sample but 
reviewed the entire loan portfolio. We also reviewed all bonds issued as of 
June 1994 in order to verify job creation, and reviewed a sample of 27 bond 
files for in-depth information. We did not review JEDA's taxable bonds as 
a separate program since only two or three have been issued. Two other 
programs, the PBBF and the export guarantee program, were reviewed 
extensively even though these programs have created few jobs. 
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However, we did not review in-depth five other JEDA programs that· have 
either had no activity or have issued few loans: 
• CDBG Microenterprise Loan Fund. 
• Intermediary Relending Program. 
• SCANA Development Revolving Loan Fund. 
• CDBG Loan Program for Rural Communities. 
• Savannah Valley Regional Loan Fund. 
We relied on the work of the outside independent auditor contracted by the 
agency to assess the agency's major internal financial controls. During the 
course of our audit, we used limited computer-generated data. This data was 
not integral to our audit objectives and we did not therefore perform a test 
of the systems. We relied on third-party confirmation performed by the 
outside auditor regarding current loan balances. We confirmed any other 
items that appeared to be questionable on a case-by-case basis. 
We confirmed job statistics with the South Carolina Employment Security 
Commission for a small sample of companies that received assistance from 
the CDBG and CCIC direct loan programs. When necessary in our review, 
we refer to five southeastern states, namely Georgia, North Carolina, 
Mississippi, Alabama and Tennessee. 
This audit was conducted according to generally accepted governmental 
auditing standards. 
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Appendix B 
Information From CCIC' s Financial Statements a 
I Total Assets $1,470,278 $1,003,503 $1,046,224 t1,162,025 $1,601,678 $1,630,183 I t1,878,353 I t1,881,287 I t2,741,381 I $3,789,534 
,, Total Liabilities $531,533 $4,627 $100,190 $152,842 $171,102 t120,518 I t375,861 I t374,555 I t855,245 I $1,451,193 
Contributed Capital and $1,000,123 $1,000,123 $1,000,123 $1,000,123 $1,454,636 $1,464,636 I •1 ,454,636 I •1 ,464,636 I $1,624,616 I $1,624,616 
Retained Earnings/ Fund ($61,378) ($1,247) ($54,089) $9,060 ($24,060) $65,029 $47,866 $52,096 $361,520 $813,725 
Balance 
Total Operating Income $34,139 $97,168 $78,660 $100,376 $19,441 $126,066 $94,024 $19,752 $1,213,304 $1,381,846 
Total Expenses $93,396 $78,012 $140,333 $34,789 $31,536 $20,397 $101,066 $10,241 $861,784 $929,641 
Net Income After Taxes ($69,267) $19,146 ($61,653) $63,149 ($33, 120) $79,089 ($7, 163) $4,230 $361,520 $452,205 
and Extraordinary Items 
Beginning Retained ($2,121) ($61,378) ($1,247) ($54,089) $9,060 ($24,060) $55,029 t47,86g 1 g I $361,520 Earnings/Fund Balance 0 40,985 8,811 0 0 0 0 0 
Prior Period Adjustments 
Ending Retained ($61,3781 ($1,247) ($54,089) $9,060 ($24,060) $65,029 $47,866 t52,096 I t361,52o I $813,725 
Earnings/Fund Balance 
a JOBEC Corporation was established in 1984 as a for-profit corporation. It's nama was changed to Carolina Capital Investment Corporation (CCIC) in 1987, and the corporation was 
dissolved in 1992. In 1992 a not-for-profit corporation bearing tha same neme was established. 
Appendix C 
JEDA-State Funds as a Percent of 
Administrative Costs 
Personnel $472,273 
Benefits $101,335 
Other Operating $207,395 
Total Administration $781,003 
a Includes management fees to CCIC of $341,250. 
b Includes management fees to CCIC of $344,715. 
$469,142 $112,652 
$102,177 $21,580 
$266,671 $474,850a 
$837,990 $609,082 
$13 
Source: JEDA Annual Reports FY 90..91 through FY 93·94, and reports of the Comptroller General's office. 
$69,619 
$19,604 
$433,727b 
$522,950 
$0 
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SC Jobs-Economic Development Authority 
"Small Business" Criteria 
JEDA has defined "small business" by the type of industry. Individual types 
of businesses within these broad industry categories may have different 
standards. Most businesses are considered small by JEDA's size standards. 
The standard for an industry is based on either number of employees 
(calculated by averaging the total number of employees for each pay period 
during the most recently completed 12 calendar months) or average annual 
receipts for the most recently completed three fiscal years. 
If a potential borrower is close to these standards, JEDA will discuss the 
size eligibility issue with the JEDA Loan Committee. The specific standard 
for a particular business may change from time to time and some exceptions 
may apply. 
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South Carolina Jobs· Economic Development Authority 
July 6, 1995 
Mr. George L. Schroeder, Director 
South Carolina Legislative Audit Council 
400 Gervais Street 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Schroeder: 
Charles L. Appleby, ill 
Chairman 
Attached is the Authority's response to "A Management and Performance Review of the South Caronna Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority" conducted by the Legislative Audit Council. 
We are puzzled with many of your observations. It is interesting to note that over the last eleven years the South Carolina Jobs-
Economic Development Authority (JEDA) and the Carolina Capital Investment Corporation (CCIC) have been thoroughly analyzed 
and audited with views which conflict with yours as to our soundness and effectiveness. Those audits include: 
1. for JEDA the State Auditors Office for the period of 1984- 1991; Wilkes and Company, CPA (outside auditing 
firm approved by the State Auditors Office) for the period of 1992-1994. 
for CCIC Everett Adams, CPA, 1984-1987; Sharon Pate, CPA, 1988-89; Wilkes and Company, CPA, 1992-
1994. 
2. the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 1984 - 1993 for compliance and program 
performance. 
3. and the McArthur Foundation, the fifth largest charitable foundation in the country (1994). 
JEDA and CCIC have always received an unqualified opinion after a detailed full audit by each accounting firm. HUD states that 
JEDA has an outstanding record of compliance and documentation as evidenced by its recommendation for our securitization 
program. Chemical Securities, Inc., and Williams Adley, CPA, thought so highly of our loans and documentation that they 
recommended that the McArthur Foundation purchase a portion of our loans, and the McArthur Foundation agreed. 
You and your staff do make some valid points in the audit, we either have corrected these points or are 
in the process of correcting these issues at the present time. 
In regard to your Executive Summary, we would like to point out several items that we believe would be important in fairly 
evaluating your assessment. 
• We think it is extremely important it be understood that JEDA and CCIC receives only 4% of its funding from the State 
of South Carolina for day-to-day operating expenses. Through the work of Governor Campbell and our legislature in 
South Carolina, legislation was passed several years ago that allowed us to become self-sufficient. 
1201 Main Street, Suite 1750 Columbia, South Carolina 29201 803-737-0079 FAX (803) 737-0016 
Mr. George L. Schroeder 
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• In your opening statement in the Executive Summary, you stated that we significantly overstated job creations to the 
General Assembly and to the Governor. We take exception to this remark. In it, specifically you talked about 1,883 jobs 
to a company that is no longer in business and indicated that we should not have counted these jobs. As our response 
indicates in detail, the loan that we made to this company allowed these 1,883 South Carolina citizens to continue on the 
job in excess of 26 weeks (with a total payroll of approximately $10 million) at a conservatively estimated savings to the 
taxpayers of South Carolina of approximately $650,000. It is not uncommon for businesses to close at some point after 
formal opening. 
• JED A's function is to lend money to companies trying to provide or retain jobs for South Carolina citizens. All of our 
loan decisions are based on the financial condition of the company at the time the loan is made and also on the current 
economic conditions. While our record of charge-offs may be high in your estimation, let us remind you that in virtually 
every situation, private sector lenders involved in the deals have also underwritten the loans and provide a legitimate 
second perspective on our decision making. 
• Also, you continue to criticize us for the way we handle our loans, documentation, underwriting, etc. yet, you indicate 
correctly that JEDA was able to securitize a part of its loan portfolio because of the size of the portfolio, length and 
accuracy of its payment history and uniformity of loan standards. During the asset securitization process, the first of any 
government agency in the country using CDBG monies, we were audited by HUD, an investment banking firm, an outside 
independent accounting firm and the charitable foundation that purchased the loans. All of the groups thought we had 
done an outstanding job. This securitization allowed us to leverage CDBG funds and relend them. 
• Your last recommendation to the legislature is that they may want to consider bringing JEDA under the Department of 
Commerce. We feel strongly that JEDA should continue to be an independent agency for the following reasons; (a) as 
referenced in number one above, JEDA receives only 4% of its funding from the State of South Carolina, therefore, for 
all practical purposes it is a self-sufficient agency of state government; (b) the present structural arrangement between 
JEDA and its subsidiary corporation, CCIC, was approved by the Department of Housing and Urban Development after 
great deliberation and is deemed essential to JEDA's ongoing ability to remain self-sufficient; (c) additionally, the 
agreement that HUD officials approved involves the all critical lending area. Again, any significant statutorial change 
would greatly impair JEDA' s ability to make loans and guarantees utilizing HUD' s Community Development Block Grant 
monies. As of May 31, 1995, JEDA has loaned $57,386,040 using Community Development Block Grant program funds. 
Therefore, JEDA's ability to remain independent is critical to maintaining its self sufficient status, protecting an all 
important revenue source for economic development lending and to making sound lending decisions without direct political 
influence. JEDA as the state's bank for economic development is a strong team member in the overall statewide economic 
development effort for South Carolina. Not all economic development agencies operate under the auspices of the 
Department of Commerce, nor should they. More important is how they function as a member of the team and it should 
be noted that we participate as a full member of the Coordinating Council for Economic Development. 
We hope that you will do us the courtesy of providing a copy of this letter, along with our complete response, to anyone who 
would receive a copy of your report. 
Further, Elliott Franks and I would welcome the opportunity to discuss any of the LAC audit with you in the hopes that there may 
be parts of it that we can agree are not appropriate and should be taken out or revised accordingly. 
Sincere" /A • /1 c&.n.w.~.a~ 
AGENCY COMMENTS 
RESPONSE TO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Page i) 
1 JEDA's involvement, as with any other lender, is not a guaranty that the business will succeed. JEDA makes every effort to 
protect existing jobs by offering below market rates and favorable terms which is consistent with the designed use of the CDBG loan 
funds. Since this is an inherently risky program, business closings are inevitable. Nonetheless, without JEDA's assistance, the 
specific company cited by the LAC would have closed six months sooner, thus JEDA did in fact retain those 1,883 jobs. 
While this loan resulted in a loss of $85,000, it saved the state a minimum of $642,568 in unemployment and related benefits. (SEE 
EXHIBIT I) JEDA has always projected the job creation number when other government agencies have used CDBG dollars on the 
same projects. However. we cannot control nor dictate job counting procedures for other govenunent entities where funds 
other than CDBG are involved. JEDA has already implemented new procedures for the counting of all jobs and will reduce it to 
writing without delay. 
LAC failed to mention that the HUD report reviewed was an audit finding of a docmnentation error only. The HUD audit cited 
the need for documentation stating JEDA's assistance was required to prevent the closure of the business. The finding did NOT 
question whether or not .JEDA's assistance in the project was required as the LAC incorrectly states. LAC also failed to 
mention that the corrective action JEDA took to prevent the inadvertent omission of supporting documentation in future loans cleared 
the HUD finding. See the attached excerpts from a 1990 letter issued by HUD clearing JEDA of this exception. All job retention 
loans made since the audit finding contain such documentation. 
We find it curious that the LAC feels the number of jobs created "has little value in determining the effect of JED A's programs on 
client businesses and on the economic welfare of South Carolina citizens" yet criticizes JEDA harshly for its method of record keeping 
of jobs created. 
2 Legal counsel has opined that the Authority has not violated its statute and by-laws. This procedure is consistent with financial 
practices of corporate lending institutions and is not inconsistent with the Authority's enabling legislation. 
JEDA's Loan Committee consists of five of the eight Board members and, when convened, constitutes a majority of the Board of 
Directors. No Loan Officer at JEDA can approve loans; however, the Board of Directors authorized the CEO and the COO to 
approve loans up to a certain level. There is no violation of JED A's statutorial mandate. (SEE EXHIBIT IV) 
3 We agree with the LAC's comment because we are a "niche" lender and we assume a greater risk than conventional lenders. The 
reason that we assume these risks is due to the economic benefits that accrue to the state. Deferment, as a practical matter, is a 
routine course of action in the banking industry to assist a company whose cash flow may be temporarily impaired. Relative to the 
increase, it is in direct proportion to the growth in the portfolio. The charge-off numbers posted by other in-state economic 
development entities are misleading. The Small Business Administration (SBA) and the Business Development Corporation (BDC) 
are unlike JEDA in that their primary position is protected, the SBA via its first lien on collateral and the BDC through its guarantees 
provided by the SBA. The COGs are relatively new to the lending arena, consequently, most of their portfolios are still in their 
infancy and too early in the lending process to accurately measure their charge off rates. 
4 Measures such as job quality, targeting specific industries, helping distressed counties and small businesses, and quality of service 
are important to JEDA's program outcomes. Section 41-43-90 states that JEDA "may" collect and analyze economic development 
information and is not mandated. However, JEDA, because of its limited resources, focuses on lending and utilizes such entities as 
Research and Statistics and the research capabilities of the Department of Commerce. JEDA establishes, to the contrary, goals and 
performance measures each year. They are established by the staff and presented annually to the Board of Directors for approval. 
JEDA's methodology with regard to the implementation of new programs has not been disjointed; however, carefully planned. The 
more diversity an entity has in its lending arsenal, the more creative and flexible it can be in structuring a transaction to fit a 
company's needs. Below are examples of some of the programs created and why: 
Palmetto Basic Building Fund (PBBF) -This program was developed by JEDA in an attempt to assist rural areas in the state 
devastated by Hurricane Hugo. The program was designed so that speculative buildings could be built in those areas to assist 
economic development professionals in attracting industry to these areas. Funds for the program were provided by EDA and HUD 
and financed the construction of five (5) of the six (6) speculative buildings in the following rural counties: Lancaster, Marion, 
Chester and Darlington. At the inception of the PBBF program, the national objective required by HUD was urgent need. During 
the program tenure, the requirement was changed from "urgent need" to job creation. HUD defines the National Objective "Urgent 
need" as "if the unit of general local govenunent certifies, and the state determines, that the activity is designed to alleviate 
existing conditions which pose a serious and immediate threat to the health or welfare of the community which are of recent 
origin or which recently became urgent, tbat the unit of general local govenunent is unable to finance the activity on its own, 
and tbat other sources of funding are not available. A condition will generally be considered to be of recent origin if it 
developed or became urgent within 18 months preceding the certification by the unit of general local govermnent". 
SCANA Revolving Loan Fund - This program is an excellent example of the public-private relationships that former Governor 
Campbell applauded. SCANA, heavily involved in economic development, sought to create a revolving fund to leverage its resources 
more efficiently. SCANA approached JEDA about managing and administering this fund as they were not in the lending business. 
SCANA capitalized the fund and designated its target markets, primarily, its rural South Carolina service area. 
Intennediary Relending Program (IRP) • This program is funded by the former Farmers Home Administration (FmHA). This 
program targets small businesses in the rural areas of South Carolina. The maximum level of participation on any one transaction 
is $175,000 and the business must be located in an area whose population is 25,000 or less. 
5 To date JEDA, through all of its programs has been involved in all but one historically economically distressed county (Lee) and 
a loan has been approved but not yet closed in that county. Furthermore, JEDA has obtained labor force data as compiled by the 
Employment Security Commission and reviewed its CDBG lending activity through 1992 with the following results. Of the 152 
CDBG loans made during that period, totalling over $43,000,000, 44.46% of the dollars loaned benefitted 21 historically distressed 
counties. JEDA's lending activities bave served distressed areas of the state. (SEE Exhibit m 
6 JEDA has developed its definition of "small business" and will adopt it at its next scheduled board meeting. 
7 JEDA could not determine the method of calculation used by the LAC. Contrary to the LAC report, an examination of the 88 
bond issues reveals the following: 3, 776 jobs were anticipated to be created; while 6,405 jobs were actually created. JEDA believes 
the cost per job reported by LAC is inaccurate. The aggregate bond dollars issued is $477,141,000. When using actual employment, 
the cost per job is $74,495 ($477,141,000 + 6,405 jobs). Unlike CDBG funds, which are generally used to fund smaller projects, 
IDBs are used for capital expansion which is usually much more costly. It is entirely natural for the IDB cost per job to be greater 
than the $25K CDBG standard due to the differences in the financing programs. If lOBs were not available, South Carolina would 
not remain as competitive and prospect companies would probably seek tax considerations from other states causing a loss of jobs 
to the state. It should be noted that the IDB program has historically been responsible for expanding existing companies and a critical 
incentive in bringing major companies and jobs to South Carolina. Failure to create all planned jobs by some companies is a reality 
of the economic environment for which JEDA should not be blamed. 
8 As a result of interstate mergers the international banking expertise has been lost in South Carolina. JEDA is the only entity that 
can provide international banking advice locally. By having this expertise "in-house", foreign prospects do not have to seek financial 
advice outside the state. JEDA's mandate to provide international related services is unique in scope compared to the domestic 
programs JEDA offers to South Carolina businesses, in that, the lending function for exports plays only a small part of the total 
international effort. LAC referenced only the documented activities which could be verified. A majority of the time was spent 
offering consulting services to South Carolina businesses through telephonic conferences and meetings with business representatives 
at various international functions in South Carolina. The consulting service is considered a very valuable activity, particularly on 
international banking matters, since small and medium sized banks in South Carolina do not have international banking capabilities. 
The U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration's South Carolina office, as well as the Small Business 
Administration's, South Carolina office has no local expertise on export financing or international banking matters. Therefore, the 
representatives of these federal agencies refer their customers to JEDA for assistance or expertise on various international financing 
matters. The LAC report makes reference to the SBA and Eximbank programs which are readily available and are an alternative 
source for South Carolina businesses. Although both governmental agencies offer export financing services for working capital 
purposes their programs are less than satisfactory and have not been used by many businesses. Therefore, SBA and Eximbank jointly 
initiated a one year study to rejuvenate their export working capital financing programs. As a result of the study, they started a joint 
one year pilot program on October 1, 1994. The officials of both agencies hope that this pilot program will be more user friendly 
and accepted more widely by the business community. 
Less than half of the 50 states offer export working capital financing. JEDA's program is unique in that it the only program which 
is not supported by state appropriated dollars. It was the creditability of the JEDA international staff that provided private commercial 
banks the confidence necessary to provide a credit facility for domestic lending which included export financing. With the exception 
of California, most states have only one full-time staff member promoting international financing programs. Due to the unique nature 
of export financing, the participating states do no more than three to five deals per year on the average. 
9 The Palmetto Basic Building Program was created as a marketing tool to attract businesses/companies to rural, economically 
distressed areas affected by Hurricane Hugo not for job creation. The job creation requirement was instituted by a change in HUD 
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regulations subsequent to the beginning of the Program. JEDA has, at no time, been out of compliance with satisfying either of the 
HUD National Objectives. Incidentally, three of the six buildings constructed were done so in economically distressed areas and 50 
people are now gainfully employed as a result of this Program. Buildings have been constructed in such areas as Lancaster, Marion, 
Darlington and Chester. (SEE EXHIBIT III) 
10 In each of the four(4) cases the LAC cited all available collateral and practical personal guarantees were obtained. While these 
losses are undesirable, one must keep in mind that economic development goals are not always consistent with loan underwriting. 
Loan #1: The Borrower was a dyeing and finishing company. $1.9 million was outstanding from this company prior to this loan 
being made. In 1987, this loan was made and the two preceding loans were refinanced at the request of the Governor, a resident 
member of the General Assembly, and city and county officials. The overall funding package strengthened the collateral position 
of the credit. The former operator of the facility, a large textile company, provided the company with collateral incentives, as a result 
of the Governor's involvement. While the project was undercollateralized, the commitment also helped the town ensure the solvency 
of its water system. This funding also provided 220 jobs in a rural community for more than two years. 
Loan #2: This loan was made to a textile company. The request for assistance was made by the Governor and the State Development 
Board. The rationale for this loan focused on protecting 1,800 jobs in 13 rural comrounities in South Carolina. This credit was based 
on orders the company had, and was secured by inventory. The borrower closed their operation for credit reasons and abandoned 
the collateral to JEDA and, as a result, the inventory was sold at a deep discount. After discounting the merchandise and commissions 
paid, an $8SK loss resulted. This transaction was risky, however, worth the risk in an effort to protect over 1,800 South Carolina 
jobs. Although adequate collateral was obtained at the time the loan was made, some inventory was sold at a discount, and a 
commission had to be paid to sell the inventory, JEDA recaptured almost 90% of its investment. The company was a publicly traded 
company and no personal guaranties were available. Exhibit I illustrates the impact JEDA's assistance made to the state. 
Loan #3: This loan was an agribusiness loan. The State Development Board and the State Department of Agriculture asked for our 
assistance in attracting this company to South carolina. Our research indicated that the president was dismissed because of his 
inability to manage the operation and not for European drug-related crimes, for which he was fully pardoned. Because the potential 
guarantor resided in Guatemala it was not practical to obtain his guarantee. JEDA did not influence any law changes as the LAC 
suggests. JEDA is a self-sufficient, free-enterprise agency of the state and is always concerned about any losses incurred by the state. 
However, since JEDA does not promulgate this legislative policy, it cannot be held responsible for the loss of revenues to the state 
as cited in the LAC report. 
Loan #4: The Borrower on this transaction was a wood specialty company. The Board member conveyed his property because he 
was a concerned citizen who believed he was acting in the best interest of his community. The records document that he did not profit 
from pledging his land in support of this project. JEDA agrees that this loan was undercollateralized, however, all available collateral 
was obtained. This was a loan to a business in a rural community that would create 35 jobs. Approximately twenty (20) people were 
employed for lS-18 months before the business closed. 
11 CCIC, as a credit facility, is different from JEDA and is funded, in part, by four major financial institutions in South Carolina. 
At local community banks, funding under a facility of this nature, sometimes is utilized by the borrower at the 100% level. CCIC 
on occasion, after exercising due diligence, will fund transactions similar to local community banks. 
12 There was not an inappropriate use of loan proceeds in the referenced loan. This statement refers to a loan made to an 
entrepreneur to assist in acquiring the stock of a radio station. The loan proceeds allowed the present owner to purchase the stock 
of the radio station and, in essence, gain control of the enterprise. This loan facilitated minority ownership in an under-represented 
industry. 
JEDA's conflict of interest policy has been strengthened effective May 18, 1995. 
13 This is not a violation of state law. A formal opinion from legal counsel clarifies this question. The $583,000 in question were 
monies paid by JEDA to CCIC for certain administrative expenses pursuant to the management contract between these parties and 
further, these payments were made per the receipt of proper invoices from CCIC. (SEE EXHIBIT IV) 
The agency had rw:a~ audits perfonned by Wllkes & Company, CPA, in the years in question and no findings were noted. 
14 Administrative Cbarafs - The maturing of JEDA and CCIC has been the result of constant transitioning and learning. We have 
revisited our methods of calculating administrative recovery rates and taken corrective action where needed. CCIC has reimbursed 
JEDA for all administrative cost over recovery and loan servicing cost over recovery through June 30, 1994. The fee rates for FY94-
9S have been adjusted periodically to insure proper cost recovery by year end. 
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Payment of Fees (page 42)- The decision to leave the $161,000 servicing fee with JEDA, relative to the IDB Program, was made 
by the Chief Executive Officer with the full knowledge of the JEDA and CCIC Boards of Directors; however, this decision was not 
reflected in a modification of the Service Contract. Any future changes to the management agreement will be made in writing. 
Because of JEDA's expertise in the commercial lending area, the Division of Economic Development in the Governor's Office 
contracted with JEDA to administer the Minority Loan Program (MLP). This included, but was not limited to underwriting, 
marketing, credit evaluation, servicing, collection and any other duties as related to the MLP. For these services a contract was 
negotiated and a flat fee of $75,000 authorized to be paid JEDA. This included the administration of any and all loans made under 
this program for a two year period. This contractual arrangement is very similar to that used in JED A's relationship with the SCAN A 
Revolving Loan Fund and Savannah Lakes Revolving Loan Fund, in that, JEDA was paid a flat fee for its services, rather than an 
amount based on cost recovery. 
Once there is demonstrated income in the PBBF Program appropriate adjustments will be made. 
The Department of Commerce is in the midst of developing a Strategic Plan which hopefully will address what capital gaps exist in 
South Carolina. The Secretary of Commerce has been very clear with respect to JEDA's critical role in addressing the capital gaps 
as we now define them. JEDA should continue to be an independent agency. This independence allows JEDA to make sound lending 
decisions without direct political influence and at the same time, be a strong team member in the overall statewide economic 
development effort for South Carolina. 
MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS (Page vii) 
15 This assumption is fallacious, JEDA has and continues to work very closely with the Department of Commerce and other 
statewide and local development entities. 
JEDA created statewide economic development initiatives as part of its pro-active approach and in doing so developed a composite 
industrial development bond program which was among the first in the nation and coordinated with HUD to close the first asset 
securitization transaction in the nation using CDBG loans. It also assisted the Governor's Office in closing some of the first 
transactions in the country involving State participation in HUD's Section 108 program. 
16 This implies that the two Boards made up of outstanding citizens of South Carolina, eight (8) of whom are appointed by the 
Governor, do not have the time nor the talent to properly oversee both JEDA and CCIC. 
17 The Division of Economic Development, unlike JEDA and CCIC, is not involved in the intricate business of lending nor the 
administration of a substantial portfolio. 
18 The Main Street Investment Program was not designed specifically for economic development, rather, to streamline the process 
of SBA loans less than $100,000. While South Carolina has made great strides during the twelve (12) years of JEDA's existence, 
there is nothing to suggest that the concerns the General Assembly had in 1983 about the state's ranking in per capita income, poverty 
rates, unemployment, high school graduation rates, welfare recipients, infant mortality and similar indices of economic and social 
well being placing our State at or near the bottom of the heap have changed. 
19 The State of Kentucky like the states of Massachusetts, New Jersey, Illinois, Maine, Connecticut and Maryland, all are a part 
of a respective Commerce Department, and have separate autonomous Boards which are responsible for the day to day activities and 
thereby provide the necessary safeguards between the marketing arm for economic development and the financing arm for economic 
development. 
RESPONSE TO LAC RECOMMENDATIONS (PAGE 7- 60) 
t• As mentioned in the Executive Summary JEDA is in the process of documenting its established job creation procedures, however, 
JEDA contends that the percentage between created and retained jobs is immaterial since the economic impact is the same. 
• Exhibit I illustrates that while a company may no longer have employees, the existence of these jobs at one period in time 
contributed materially to the economic benefit to the state. For this reason JEDA believes it is not necessary to categorize jobs 
attributable to charged off loans. 
• We count those jobs that are CDBG related, however, we have no control over what other lenders report. JEDA is responsible 
only for its own reporting to satisfy its loan requirements. The LAC is again criticizing a loan previously cited in its report giving 
the reader the impression that each critique is for a different loan. 
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2 JEDA only counts those jobs which are directly related to its loan(s). If JEDA makes a loan to a start up company that subsequently 
expands its operations, JEDA will claim those expansion jobs as well. Since these are start up situations, private lender financing 
is very limited. Had JEDA not loaned its resources, the company more than likely would not have started and the multiple plant site 
jobs would not have been created. Thus JEDA feels justified in claiming credit for these jobs. Only jobs in South Carolina are 
counted. The company on which the LAC based this criticism, opened plant sites in numerous distressed rural communities. 
3 This is a moot point since JEDA performs a monitoring visit to the client business semi-annually and this information is obtained 
during these visits. 
4 See Executive Summary item #2 (SEE EXIllBIT IV) 
S• JEDA/CCIC will not provide technical and managerial assistance based on recommendations from legal counsel regarding lender 
liability. 
• JEDA's loan policy clearly states that Loan Administration is not responsible for administering problem loans, but the actual 
Account Officer assigned to the credit. "Throughout the life of the credit, loan officer and loan administration personnel conduct 
periodic on-site visits with bo"owers. These visits provide infonnation essential to managing the credit and serve to keep JEDA 
current on aU aspects of the business." Also, JEDA and CCIC have developed a policy for troubled assets, namely, an Asset Quality 
Rating System and the corresponding report. The report identifies problem loans and steps to be implemented in an attempt to cure 
the problem. 
6 JEDA as a state agency, clearly understands the constitutional constraints of ownership in a private company. CCIC, as a non-state 
entity, is not bound by these same constitutional constraints. 
7 JEDA establishes, to the contrary, goals and performance measures each year. They are established by the staff, presented to and 
approved by the Board of Directors each year. 
8 This data is collected during each semi-annual monitoring visit. 
9,10 JEDA notes this with great interest and will examine the feasibility of this recommendation. 
11 This information is gathered on each semi annual monitoring visit. 
U JEDA has often served as a catalyst by stimulating the private sector to develop below market financing alternatives. For 
example, when JEDA initiated its composite bond program, South Carolina banks did not provide letters of credit for long-term 
project financing. These fees and banking relationships went to out-of-state banks. After one to two years of promoting its program, 
JEDA introduced South Carolina's three largest banks to this form of financing. Today, each of these banks has developed a strong 
"lower floater" industrial development bond program based upon their letters of credit. While the banks may have eventually 
developed these programs on their own, they most certainly would not have done so until years later than they actually· did. While 
JEDA still has this product available, the market determines its use. 
13 JEDA has assisted in numerous health care financings. The job impact from these projects is quite substantial having created 
9, lOS jobs. Moreover, JED A's participation saves money for local governments by allowing them to retain their "small issuer" status, 
which allows local governments to designate bonds for county projects as "bank qualified." This status reduces the interest costs 
which local governments must pay on their projects. Elder care is a growing trend in the state and investment in this area is in the 
best interest of the state. Participating in healthcare bond issues further diversifies loan activities and is viewed as critical to 
improving the quality of life for South Carolina and its citizens. (SEE Exhibit V) 
14 As stated in the Executive Summary, JEDA is providing these international services. 
15 We disagree with the recommendation of the Legislative Audit Council (LAC) regarding measuring the performance of the export 
program. JEDA does agree to the need for better collection of data to evaluate its international program offerings. It is our intention 
to consult with the National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA) and evaluate the key performance measures utilized 
by states with active export finance programs. Our disagreement with LAC's recommendation is found in the all important cost 
benefit area. 
16 See Executive Smnmary Item #4 
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17 The purpose of the Program is to stimulate economic development through speculative buildings which can act as a catalyst to 
attract prospects to the respective community. For that reason, JEDA does not focus on the Local Development Corporation's limited 
assets other than the land pledged in support of the project. 
18 JEDA's lending policy states that loans will not be made to businesses with a net worth of $1,000,000 or more. Under prudent 
credit standards JEDA looks for a secondary source of repayment in financially strong guarantors. A strong guarantor can minimize 
the loss of scarce monetary resources. Therefore JEDA does not preclude these types of guarantors. 
19 It is the practice of JEDA and CCIC to follow strictly the directions as articulated in the lending policies in the loan policy 
developed in 1987 and subsequently amended in 1992. Personal Guaranties as is stated in the lending policy "!'!!.U be required. w 
This is a requirement unique to every credit. 
20 CCIC is not a gap lender. Therefore, 100% financing is authorized in certain circumstances. 
It is clear that the LAC's interpretation of CCIC's bylaws is incorrect. This language refers to stimulating investments in the state 
by new and/or expanding businesses. 
21 JEDA has always ensured that loan proceeds are used in accordance with statutory requirements and has never violated these 
statutes as LAC alleges. 
22,23 Both JEDA and CCIC have amended the by-laws prohibiting loan consideration for staff members and their immediate families. 
Board action taken on May 18, 1995. 
24-27 See Executive Summary item #13 (SEE Exhibit IV) 
28,29 JEDA has and continues to periodically review its administrative charges for the CDBG program to ensure that they are 
appropriate and correct. Furthermore, CCIC has reimbursed the CDBG revolving loan fund for all administrative overcharges. 
30 With respect to the Minority Loan Program, it should be noted that JEDA entered into a "one time" contractual relationship with 
the Governor's Office. Specifically discussed in the Executive Summary item #14. 
31 The decision to leave the $161,000 servicing fee with JEDA, related to IDB Program was made by the Chief Executive Officer 
with the full knowledge of the JEDA and CCIC Boards of Directors; however, this decision was not reflected in a modification of 
the Service Contract. The respective Boards will formalize the amendment at its next Board meeting. 
32 Any future changes to the management agreement will be made in writing. 
33 Four items were listed by the LAC under Miscellaneous Expenditures the LAC stated as unnecessary and wasteful purchases. 
However, before listing the items, they stated that none of the expenditures broke any laws, state requirements, or policies. In order 
to elevate the services and visibility of JEDA's programs, JEDA must function as any other private sector business which includes 
modest business development and entertainment expenses, compensating staff in an appropriate manner, and allowing non-paid Board 
members the opportunity of visiting with other economic development people in the state and viewing projects where JEDA has made 
a loan investment. 
34 The RFP process was conducted in accordance with all proper procurement rules and regulations. 
35 According to the interpretation provided by the Secretary of State's Office on lobbying expenses at that time there was no violation 
of state laws. Per the interpretation, it was our understanding at that time only the actual time spent lobbying members of the General 
Assembly or other public officials regarding the passage of law were reportable as "lobbying expenses." All invoices were structured 
in the manner described above and throughout the term of this relationship, it our contention that all expenses were reported properly. 
36 JEDA will consider the development of relevant criteria for Loan Administrators (Loan Servicing). 
37 Historically, JEDA and CCIC have conducted internal desk audits of the loan portfolio files in order to identify possible problem 
areas. As a result of these desk audits, corrections were made to those files where appropriate. It is CCIC's intention to create a 
position for a Loan Review Officer in FY 95-96. 
By employing an experienced credit person as a Loan Review Officer, JEDA and CCIC will ensure that all loans/bonds files will 
be in full compliance with policy. 
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A further quality control measure exists because the four lenders which provide the funding perform an analysis of the credit. Their 
analysis determines if the transaction meets established standards and can be funded from CCIC's line of credit. 
38 The handling of all seized assets is performed by a specific officer. However, further refinements have been made relative to 
accounting controls to assure that all seized assets are properly accounted for and safeguarded. 
Also, it should be noted that the final independent auditor's report dated November 1, 1994, did not include any mention of JEDA 
lacking accounting controls over foreclosure action, as stated in the LAC report. 
39 As responded previously and demonstrated to the LAC, JEDA currently provides information as to which loans were sold as a 
part of the Asset Securitization Transaction and maintains a "MAST" portfolio of same. 
40 CCIC was established pursuant to Section 41-43-240 which clearly defines that any corporation established by JEDA, whether 
for profit or not for profit, is deemed to be a public corporation. Therefore, consistent with Section 30-1-10 to 30-1-140 (fitle 30, 
Chapter 1) CCIC has and will continue to adhere to the Retention Policies for Public Records, Reports and Official Documents. 
Currently, CCIC's policy mirrors JEDA's retention schedules. This has historically been acceptable to Archives. However, 
verification of this procedures was requested from the State Records Center/SC Department of Archives and History. As a result 
of this request, an update of JEDA's records retention schedules is in progress and CCIC is developing separate schedules. 
41 In the future efforts will be made to be in full compliance of the law. 
42 JEDA will provide written notices of all meetings of the Board of Directors including Committees and Subcommittees consistent 
with the SC Code Anno. §41-43-80. (SEE Exhibit IV) 
43 A formal written investment policy is currently in the process. It was management's decision, with the consent of the Board, 
to maintain a conservative stance regarding investment of funds. The need for ready availability of funds dictated our policy of 
investing in short term instruments. Historically, CCIC has invested in short term CD's and currently has all major accounts in 
overnight government security "sweep" accounts where earnings are equivalent to those offered through CD's. However, a formal 
written investment policy is currently in the process of being developed and will be presented to the Board of Directors for approval 
upon completion. 
44 Management periodically reviews all deposit accounts and recommends closing accounts when appropriate. 
45 Historically, CCIC has invested in short term CD's and currently has all major accounts in overnight government security "sweep" 
accounts where earnings are equal to or exceed those of the State Treasurer's Office Investment Pool. However, a formal written 
investment policy is currently in the process of being developed and will be presented to the Board of Directors for approval upon 
completion. 
46 The Department of Commerce is in the midst of developing a Strategic Plan which hopefully will address what capital gaps exist 
in South Carolina. The Secretary of Commerce has been very clear with respect to JED A's critical role in addressing the capital gaps 
as we now define them. 
47 JEDA presently is a part of a Committee which includes the Budget and Control Board, the Governor's Office, and the 
Department of Commerce in reviewing the usage of Tax-Exempt bonds and the wisdom of setting priorities as to how and to whom 
these bonds should be allocated. 
li!lJ11;. Please note that the Legislative Audit Council's space restrictions would not allow the necessary space for publication of aU 
the Exhibits used in response to the entire audit. JEDA. will make these Exhibits available to interested parties. 
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OMEGA 
... OLYMt .... If C.HNOS OUJ• ~ •NC. 1331 SOUTH CHIWCOTHE ROAD·AURORA. OH104.Q02·9218 ·TEL..: l216l562·520l• FAX: 12t8l562-7452 
Tt1om11s E. Deller 
Pr•siaent ud CEO 
Fax Message: 803/737..001 S 
Mr. Elliott E. Franks, Ill. CEO 
South Carolina Job Economic Development Authority 
1201 Main Street. Suite 1750 
Columbia. SC 29201 
Dear Elliott: 
March 20. 1995 
We wanted to drop you a note to thank you for your efforts on our behalf which resulted in 
our bringing Carsonite International Corporation to the Hampton County area. The JEOA 
Spec Building Program was critical in our decision regarding the location of Carsonite 
International Corporation. We expect that within a relatively short period of time the facility 
will have approximately ninety (90) full-time employees and hope to grow beyond that in the 
future. 
Thanks again and congratulations on such a farsighted 
TED:jec 
Thomas E. Deller 
President & CEO 
/' 
j 
EXHIBIT IV 
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NEXSEN PRUET jACOBS & POLLARD, LLP 
ATTORNEYS ANO COUNSELORS AT LAW 
W. THOMAS LAVENDER, JR. 
PARTNER 
June 1, 1995 
Elliott E. Franks, III, Executive Director 
South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority 
1201 Main Street, Suite 1750 
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 
Dear Mr. Franks: 
DIRECT DIAL 
803·253·8233 
Reply to Columbia 
At your request, we have reviewed selected portions of the 
April 1995 South Carolina Legislative Audit Council's Report to the 
General Assembly entitled "A Management and Performance Review of 
the South Carolina Jobs-Economic Development Authority" (the 
"Review"). Specifically, you have asked that we respond to three 
(3) alleged deficiencies concerning the agency's operations as set 
forth in the Review. Each alleged deficiency will be discussed 
below. 
1. Loan Committee. 
The Review suggests that the South Carolina Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority's (the "Authority") practice of allowing a 
commit tee of the board of directors, as well as certain loan 
officers, to approve loans is a violation of S.C. Code Anno. § 41-
43-10, et seq. (Lawyers Co-op. 1993) (the "Act") and the Authority's 
bylaws. (Review p. 12). The Review cites S.C. Code Anno. § 41-43-
60 of the Act which states that a majority vote of the directors in 
office is required to take action. 
While no express authority is granted in the Act for the board 
of directors to delegate any of the board's authority to a 
committee of the board, S.C. Code Anno. § 41-43-90 of the Act 
states that the Authority (not the board) is a: 
"public body, politic and corporate, and an agency of the 
State and may: (A) Adopt bylaws, procedures, and 
regulations for the directors, officers, and the 
employees and for the implementation and operation of the 
programs authorized by this act." (emphasis added). 
The Authority pursuant to Article III, Section 1 of the Authority's 
bylaws has authorized the establishment of a Loan Committee. 
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The general corporate law permits a board of directors, if 
permitted in the corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws, 
to delegate certain authority of the board of directors to 
committees established by the board. Corporations, as well as 
agencies of the State are guided by policy established by its board 
of directors and implemented by its officers and employees. 
Although the bylaws do not expressly authorize the Loan Committee 
to approve loans, only that such committee be formed, the Act 
provides that the Authority, not the board of directors, may make 
loans. Although it would be preferable that the bylaws expressly 
authorize the Loan Committee to approve the loans, the board of 
directors has continuously ratified the actions of the Loan 
Committee, thus confirming the intent of the board of directors. 
Furthermore, a practical analysis would lead one to conclude 
that the Loan Committee could be formed to approve the Authority's 
loans. The Review suggests that the Authority may only act upon a 
majority vote of the board of directors. Taking this argument 
literally, all decisions of the Authority, including the purchase 
of supplies and other routine office decisions, would require the 
approval of the directors. Clearly, such an interpretation of the 
Act would lead to an unworkable management structure. The Review 
fails to recognize the distinction between the Authority and the 
board of directors. The Act prescribes the powers of the 
Authority, not the board of directors. The Authority, not merely 
the board of directors, is authorized to make loans and grants. 
Although the policies of the Authority may be established by the 
board of directors, this does not expressly limit the powers of the 
Authority to those specified by the board. Consequently, there is 
no specific statutory requirement that grants and loans be approved 
by the full board of directors. 
Attention is also called to S.C. Code Anno. § 41-43-60 which 
states that the board must meet at least one time each calendar 
quarter. Meeting so infrequently prohibits the board from being 
available to address and approve each loan made by the Authority. 
In such event, someone or some group must have the power to carry 
on the Authority's business between board meetings. In this 
instance, the Loan Committee reviews and approves all loans greater 
than $50, 000 and allows other loans to be approved by duly 
appointed loan officers. This procedure is consistent with 
financial practices of corporate lending institutions and is not 
inconsistent with the Authority's enabling legislation. 
133372.1-~T (WTL) 012783-J 
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2. Payments to Not-For-Profit. 
EXHIBIT IV 
Page 3 of 3 
The Review questions the Authority's payment of funds to 
Carolina Capital Investment Corporation ("CCIC"), a not-for-profit 
related entity of the Authority, which then loans the funds to 
borrowers. (Review page 40). The Review states that the "transfer" 
of such funds is a violation of S.C. Code Anno. § 41-43-220, which 
provides that only administrative expenses be payable out of 
administrative funds. 
It is our understanding that these funds were appropriated to 
the Authority as "administrative funds" and that payments were made 
to cere as compensation for "3.dministrative expenses" pursuant to 
the management contract between the parties and that these payments 
were made periodically upon receipt of proper invoices from CCIC. 
To the contrary, you advise that such funds were not "transferred" 
to cere as a lump sum into its "revolving loan fund" as implied in 
the Review. Based upon this information, it appears that the use 
of such funds in this manner was for the payment of legitimate 
administrative expenses, and, therefore, not in direct violation of 
the Act as the Review suggests. 
3. Freedom of Information Act. 
The Review criticizes the Authority's failure to disclose the 
minutes of the Loan Committee under the Freedom of Information Act, 
S.C. Code Anno. § 30-4-80 ("FOIA"). (Review page 52). It appears 
from our review of the FOIA that the definition of "public body" 
includes the Authority's board of directors and any committees and 
subcommittees of the board of directors. S.C. Code Anno. § 30-4-
20(a). As a consequence, written notice of all meetings of the 
board of directors, including committees and subcommittees of the 
board of directors, must be given in the manner provided by S.C. 
Code Anno. § 41-43-80. 
I hope that this letter has adequately addressed your 
questions. If you need anything further, please do not hesitate to 
contact me. 
WTLjr:tbp 
~wrs, 
( (~{.Aft}X,~'A~.AI 
w. Thoma~ender, Jr. 
\_/ 
l33372. :-LT (WT!.) Ol2783-·~ 
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HENRY B. RICHARDSON. JR. 
COUNTY A TTOANEY 'umter d!ounty 
>umter, jLtut~ Oiurolina 
29150 
May 31, 1995 
Mr. Elliott E. Franks, III 
Executive Director 
South Carolina Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority 
FAX (803) 737-0016 
1201 Main Street, S:uite 1750 
Columbia, S. C .• 29201 
VIA FAX 
Re: ISSUANCE OF HOSPITAL BONDS BY JEDA 
Dear Mr. Franks: 
P.l 
EXHIBIT V 
P.O. BOX 1716 
SUMTER. SC 29151 
AREA CODE 803 
ns-53131 
TEL.EFAX 
ns-t365 
Sumter County benefits from the South Carolina Jobs-Economic 
Development Authority's ability to issue bonds for SOl(c) (3) 
hospitals. If Tuomey Regional Medical Center is restricted to 
issuing bonds through Sumter County, Sumter County will be pre-
cluded from taking advance of Section 265 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
This section allows the County to sell bonds and enter into 
equipment lease purchase agreements at more attractive rates. To 
take advantage of Section 265, the County must keep all of its 
borrowings under $10,000,000. Bonds issued for 501(c)(3} organi-
zations such as Tuomey Regional Medical Center count against our 
$10,000,000 limit. 
With kindest personal regards, I remain 
Yours very truly~ c· _/? 
~cf~dU~~r-
HBRjr:bj 
Enclosures 
CC: Mr. William T. Noonan 
County Administrator 
Sumter County Courthouse 
141 North Main Street 
Sumter, s. C. 29150 
Benry B. Richardson, Jr. 
' 
.J 
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bound copies were printed at a 
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